There has to be a fix.
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Title:
software sources not appear
Status in Launchpad itself:
Invalid
Status in gconf
21.04
El 4 ago. 2021 4:16 +0200, Daniel van Vugt <1303...@bugs.launchpad.net>,
escribió:
> Thanks. Which Ubuntu version is that?
>
> ** Changed in: pulseaudio (Ubuntu)
> Status: Won't Fix => Incomplete
>
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> report.
>
Latest Ubuntu version.
Same bug, ten years ago...
Spdif Digital 5.1 not appears. Only HDMI 5.1.
El jue, 29 jul 2021 a las 22:13, Daniel van Vugt (<
1303...@bugs.launchpad.net>) escribió:
> Thank you for reporting this bug to Ubuntu.
> Ubuntu 20.10 (groovy) reached end-of-life on July 22, 2021.
Nothing new?
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Title:
Digital S/PDIF output is not present in 5.1 mode
Status in pulseaudio package in Ubuntu:
Missing option is
SPDIF Digital 5.1
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Title:
Digital S/PDIF output is not present in 5.1 mode
Status in
The same mistake in gorilla.
** Attachment added: "4.jpeg"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/pulseaudio/+bug/1303316/+attachment/5437227/+files/4.jpeg
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Hello again. The problem remains unsolved several years later. I am with Ubuntu
Eoan (19.10).
The solution I used before to get the SPDIF digital optical output to work no
longer works. Can someone please try to fix this problem?
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Public bug reported:
[Impact]
* As discussed in bug #1628745, the following kernel commit changes
AppArmor mediation behavior on exec transitions:
commit 9f834ec18defc369d73ccf9e87a2790bfa05bf46
Author: Linus Torvalds
Date: Mon Aug 22 16:41:46 2016 -0700
binfmt_elf: switch
Hello Peret - To test the kernel that I built, you need to install the
linux-modules, linux-modules-extra and linux-image-unsigned .deb
packages and then reboot. After rebooting, run 'cat
/proc/version_signature' and ensure that "lp1827040.1" is included in
the output. Then try your iptables
Hi Peret - Thanks for the bug report. I was browsing through the kernel
commit log and I think this bug may already be fixed by the following
commit:
commit 916f6efae62305796e012e7c3a7884a267cbacbf
Author: Florian Westphal
Date: Wed Apr 17 02:17:23 2019 +0200
netfilter: never get/set
When running a test kernel with Christian's patch, the dir-seek test
case passes:
$ ./dir-seek
PASS: orig_count (9) == new_count (9)
Unfortunately, I can't be sure that apparmor policy is loaded correctly
when creating a new LXD container due to the apparmor portion of this
bug report.
I was able to narrow down this apparmor_parser error to shiftfs:
AppArmor parser error for /etc/apparmor.d/sbin.dhclient in
/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/home at line 25: Could not process include
directory '/etc/apparmor.d/tunables/home.d' in 'tunables/home.d'
The problem stems from shiftfs not
I noticed that confinement inside of LXD containers works fine when
shiftfs is disabled:
$ sudo rmmod shiftfs
$ sudo mv /lib/modules/5.0.0-11-generic/kernel/fs/shiftfs.ko .
$ sudo systemctl restart snap.lxd.daemon
$ lxc launch ubuntu-daily:d noshift
Creating noshift
Starting
Jamie said that he'd pull in the postinst snippet and include that
change in an upload that he's already preparing.
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: New => In Progress
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Jamie Strandboge (jdstrand)
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It looks like the change mentioned in the above comment came from
Debian. Here's the commit:
https://salsa.debian.org/apparmor-
team/apparmor/commit/dc14f24b2c2943c29d0368f913020f1307d8f1d3
They obviously don't have so they
opted to remove that logic from the postinst. I think we should have
This failure was noticed by the kernel team as it makes the kernel
autopkgtests to fail while running QRT's test-apparmor.py.
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided => High
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I see this change in the debdiff from the last apparmor upload to what's
currently in proposed:
diff -Nru apparmor-2.12/debian/apparmor-profiles.postinst
apparmor-2.13.2/debian/apparmor-profiles.postinst
--- apparmor-2.12/debian/apparmor-profiles.postinst 2018-03-22
20:19:58.0 +
Public bug reported:
The apparmor-profiles binary package from apparmor 2.13.2-9ubuntu2 in
disco-proposed is not handling the chromium-browser profile and
abstraction correctly. It installs the profile but not the abstraction
which makes profile loading fail.
$ sudo apt install
** Also affects: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu Cosmic)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Fix Released
** Changed in: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu Cosmic)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Marcelo Cerri (mhcerri)
** Changed in:
** Also affects: apparmor
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: apparmor
Status: New => Confirmed
** Changed in: apparmor
Importance: Undecided => Medium
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** Also affects: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu Cosmic)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu Xenial)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Marcelo Cerri (mhcerri)
** Changed in: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu Bionic)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Marcelo Cerri (mhcerri)
** Also affects: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu Bionic)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: initramfs-tools (Ubuntu Xenial)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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I've uploaded an fscrypt security update to the Ubuntu Security PPA.
Ubuntu Security will release it once they've reviewed and approved the
changes.
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
** Changed in: shadow (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Invalid
** Changed in:
Public bug reported:
Whilst working normally, I was unable to interact with gnome-shell. The
clock at the top of the screen continued to increment, and I could ssh
in to the machine, but clicking anywhere on the screen resulted in
nothing. Changing to another VTY and back again had no effect.
New => In Progress
** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Tyler Hicks (tyhicks)
** Also affects: linux (Ubuntu Trusty)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: whoopsie (Ubuntu Trusty)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affec
I don't think the Security or Foundations teams plan to make any changes
in Whoopsie so I'm marking these tasks as invalid.
** Changed in: whoopsie (Ubuntu Trusty)
Status: New => Invalid
** Changed in: whoopsie (Ubuntu Xenial)
Status: New => Invalid
** Changed in: whoopsie (Ubuntu
@lahtis deb packaging doesn't provide us the granularity to have the
kernel packages specifically depend on intel-microcode packages on Intel
x86 systems and amd64-microcde on AMD x86 systems. Instead, we have to
depend on both packages. If you have an Intel processor, the AMD
microcode is not
@amribrahim1987 you've probably noticed but we have released an
amd64-microcode update recently:
https://usn.ubuntu.com/3690-1/
Updates for AMD microcode will be provided in the amd64-microcode
package and not in linux-firmware.
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Cascardo asked me to review and sponsor the s390-tools debdiff to
xenial-proposed. While I don't have a an easy way to test this change
myself, I've verified that it matches the changes from Adam Conrad in
Bionic and that the change looks reasonable. Cascardo ensured me that an
SRU is not needed
@ogra it isn't obvious how the fix for this bug could have caused bug
1733557. Can you elaborate?
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Title:
Local
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1754294 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1754294
I have a problem with the library too. My conflict is with spotify-client and
hosty.
Spotify-client requires libcurl3, and installing it uninstalls curl, which is
required to run hosty.
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There are currently no plans to SRU this fix to Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
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Title:
aa-logprof ignores dbus access
Status in
** Also affects: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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Title:
logparser.py
This was fixed in Ubuntu 17.10 when the apparmor 2.11 based upload was
made.
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: Confirmed => Fix Released
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** Summary changed:
- Can't created nested AppArmor namespaces
+ Can't create nested AppArmor namespaces
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1652101
Title:
This was released in apparmor 2.12. The upstream commit is
3afbfed9eef56d029a9a5890e5c463165530d509
** Changed in: apparmor
Status: New => Fix Released
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Closing this bug based on my last comment.
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Fix Released
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This was fixed some time ago with the apparmor 2.11 based upload to
Ubuntu 17.10.
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Fix Released
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This SRU has been stuck in xenial-proposed for too long so I decided to
go ahead and verify it myself. The zesty SRU is no longer valid since
zesty has went EoL. The xenial SRU works as expected using the Test Case
described in the bug description.
** Tags removed: verification-needed
@rbalint can you please open a new bug to track re-enabling the guest
session with proper confinement rather than piggy back on this bug?
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Thanks for the updated debdiffs! They look pretty good to me but I'm
wondering if was intentional that True is returned when the "not
os.path.exists()" checks are true but the exception handler returns
False when os.readlink() throws an errno.ENOENT OSError exception? IIUC,
both situations occur
** Changed in: apport (Ubuntu Artful)
Assignee: Canonical Security Team (canonical-security) => (unassigned)
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As for the failing Xenial snapd autopkgtests...
- amd64: The autopkgtest:ubuntu-16.04-amd64:tests/main/completion fails with
and without the libseccomp in xenial-proposed
- s390x: No tests are ever ran due to the tests requiring "machine-level
isolation" but that not being available on s390x.
@Pavithra Hello! I believe that your `aureport -l` is showing that the
bug is not fixed although I suspect that you did not install the auditd
package from zesty-proposed. Can you reply with the version of auditd
that was installed when you ran aureport?
It should be version 1:2.6.6-1ubuntu1.1
I took a quick look at this bug to attempt to locate the problem. I
originally thought it was due to the Python utils' parser not supporting
include rules that are missing a leading '#' but that's not the case
since the regex in utils/apparmor/regex.py supports such an include
rule:
RE_INCLUDE
I don't feel like the change from fstack-protector-strong
to fstack-protector should be made. The performance testing results in
the spreadsheet don't suggest that the change positively impacts
performance in a meaningful way. fstack-protector-strong slightly
outperforms fstack-protector in some
@Brian did you have any thoughts on the debdiff?
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Title:
Please re-enable container support in apport
Status in
Sigh... Thanks for being patient with me on that. I think my brain just
wrote everything at the top of main() off as setting up the namespace
for some reason. That's embarrassing... :)
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The reason I'm being picky about the pidns thing is because I think this
update needs to go through -security since it fixes regressions caused
by the security update. We try to be as conservative as possible with
those updates.
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If you don't run the `ulimit -c unlimited` command, your crash program
will not result in apport writing out a core file.
However, even if you don't run that command, the reproducer in bug
1726372 will cause apport to write out a core file.
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I suspect that you're correct but I'd rather not widen the attack
surface of apport without having a strong reason to do so. If there's
not strong justification, maybe enabling the handling of those crashes
in the dev release and seeing how it plays out would be a better
approach.
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Going back to point #3 in comment 2, I don't see anything that will
protect against an updated apport in the host from forwarding a crash to
a non-updated apport in a container, causing the container's apport to
confuse dump_mode as a global_pid. Am I missing something that protects
against that
Do we have a strong reason to start handling crashes inside of "non-
full" containers on stable Ubuntu releases? I'm specifically talking
about when this conditional evaluates to True:
elif not is_same_ns(host_pid, "pid") and is_same_ns(host_pid, "mnt"):
If there's no strong reason, can we
The patch in comment #4 of bug 1726372 was mostly complete but issues
were discovered late as we were approached the CRD for the CVEs
described in that bug:
1) The patch should be updated to forward the new dump_mode argument into the
container. This is a trivial change.
2) The patch changed the
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
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Title:
Multiple security issues in Apport
I've successfully performed the testing described in the [libseccomp
Test Case] section of this bug description using libseccomp
2.3.1-2.1ubuntu2~16.04.1 from xenial-proposed.
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I've successfully performed the testing described in the [libseccomp
Test Case] section of the bug 1567597 description using libseccomp
2.3.1-2.1ubuntu2~16.04.1 from xenial-proposed. It includes the
libseccomp live tests (which aren't used during the build) and a
specific test of the new seccomp
A stop job is running for ifup for wlp2s0
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Title:
reduce 90s session kill timeout if the session does not shutdown
...
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Title:
reduce 90s session kill timeout if the session does not shutdown
cleanly
Status in lvm2 package in
I tested the linux kernel SRU in Xenial and Zesty using the following
linux package versions:
- xenial: linux-image-4.4.0-98-generic 4.4.0-98.121
- zesty: linux-image-4.10.0-38-generic 4.10.0-38.42
The linux kernel SRU testing was successful and followed what's
documented in the [Linux Kernel
** Changed in: ubuntu-power-systems
Assignee: Canonical Security Team (canonical-security) => Ubuntu Security
Team (ubuntu-security)
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Fixes have been uploaded to Ubuntu 17.04 and Ubuntu 16.04 LTS and should
be accepted into the respective -proposed pockets soon. I'd greatly
appreciate it if IBM could verify the fixes once they've been accepted.
There will be an automated message posted at that time instructing
anyone interested
** Description changed:
+ [Impact]
+
+ The aureport command, part of the audit userspace utilities, incorrectly
+ reports the user id of successful logins. "-1" is printed instead of the
+ expected user id.
+
+ [Test Case]
+
+ As root, run `login`. Proceed as follows:
+
+ 1. Login with a
the incorrect comment
for the purposes of this SRU.
** Changed in: audit (Ubuntu)
Assignee: Ubuntu on IBM Power Systems Bug Triage (ubuntu-power-triage) =>
Tyler Hicks (tyhicks)
** Changed in: audit (Ubuntu)
Status: New => In Progress
** Changed in: audit (Ubuntu)
Importance: Und
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1723909 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1723909
Please see https://usn.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3455-1/
** Information type changed from Public to Public Security
** This bug has been marked a duplicate of bug 1723909
[security] WPA2: Many vulnerabilities
Updates have been released:
https://usn.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3455-1/
** Changed in: wpa (Ubuntu)
Status: Confirmed => Fix Released
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Hi - I tested the libseccomp SRU in Zesty using the following libseccomp
package version:
- libseccomp2 2.3.1-2.1ubuntu2~17.04.1
I tested it with the following kernels:
- linux-image-4.10.0-37-generic 4.10.0-37.41
+ does not contain seccomp logging patches
- linux-image-4.10.0-38-generic
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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Title:
few minutes after new start of pc every
Hi Jan - congrats on creating your first bug report. We appreciate all
feedback and look forward to receiving more from you in the future.
As for this specific bug report, I suspect that it is an issue with the
package in the specific PPA that you're trying to install from. Since
PPAs are
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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Title:
package libpcre3:i386 2:8.39-3 failed to
Here's the kernel test case that I mentioned in the bug description.
** Attachment added: "lp1567597-kernel-test.c"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/snappy/+bug/1567597/+attachment/4967858/+files/lp1567597-kernel-test.c
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The Xenial and Zesty kernel patch sets have been sent to the kernel
team:
https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/kernel-team/2017-October/087448.html
https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/kernel-team/2017-October/087456.html
I've uploaded a libseccomp SRU to zesty-proposed. The Xenial SRU is
going to be
** Description changed:
A requirement for snappy is that a snap may be placed in developer mode
which will put the security sandbox in complain mode such that
violations against policy are logged, but permitted. In this manner
learning tools can be written to parse the logs, etc and make
** Description changed:
A requirement for snappy is that a snap may be placed in developer mode
which will put the security sandbox in complain mode such that
violations against policy are logged, but permitted. In this manner
learning tools can be written to parse the logs, etc and make
** Changed in: snappy
Status: Confirmed => In Progress
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Title:
implement 'complain mode' in seccomp for
@xnox bringing zesty's libseccomp back to xenial may be needed for some
kernel/snapd/libseccomp changes that I'm working on. Have you spent any
time investigating such a change?
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** Description changed:
A requirement for snappy is that a snap may be placed in developer mode
which will put the security sandbox in complain mode such that
violations against policy are logged, but permitted. In this manner
learning tools can be written to parse the logs, etc and make
Status: New
** Also affects: libseccomp (Ubuntu Zesty)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: linux (Ubuntu Xenial)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: libseccomp (Ubuntu Xenial)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: libseccomp (Ubu
Thanks! I've uploaded the libseccomp package to artful-proposed.
** Changed in: libseccomp (Ubuntu)
Status: Triaged => Fix Committed
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I had previously attached a slightly old version of the lp1567597-test.c
program that contained a mistake. I'm now attaching the corrected
version after fetching it from my testing VM.
** Attachment removed: "lp1567597-test.c"
** Changed in: libseccomp (Ubuntu)
Status: In Progress => New
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Title:
[FFe] implement 'complain mode' in
Clean Artful amd64 build log.
** Attachment added: "libseccomp_2.3.1-2.1ubuntu2_amd64.build"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/snappy/+bug/1567597/+attachment/4953122/+files/libseccomp_2.3.1-2.1ubuntu2_amd64.build
** Changed in: libseccomp (Ubuntu)
Status: Confirmed => In Progress
**
SCMP_ACT_LOG test for libseccomp.
** Description changed:
A requirement for snappy is that a snap may be placed in developer mode
which will put the security sandbox in complain mode such that
violations against policy are logged, but permitted. In this manner
learning tools can be
Debdiff to consider for Artful FFe. (I don't need sponsorship)
** Patch added: "libseccomp_2.3.1-2.1ubuntu2.debdiff"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/snappy/+bug/1567597/+attachment/4953121/+files/libseccomp_2.3.1-2.1ubuntu2.debdiff
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I agree with juliank's assessment in comment #22. The 2nd Trusty debdiff
allows md5 to be used throughout the entire cert chain which is
apparently not what Simon intended. I don't think it is the right
approach.
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Ignore my last comment. You were asking about Xenial but it was the
Trusty SRU that was blocked on ubuntu-security review.
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@sdeziel ubuntu-security was asked to comment on it a few days ago. I've
just freed up enough to take a look.
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1709193
Title:
@zyga those are both good questions.
- Detection functionality is included in kernel patches. There's a new
seccomp(2) operation to check if the log action is available and an
added test to ensure that there's a certain combination of valid/invalid
seccomp(2) arguments that can be used to detect
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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Title:
Got stop job running c1 session
Status in xorg
The kernel patches were committed to the Ubuntu Artful kernel git repo:
https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/kernel-team/2017-August/086714.html
** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu)
Status: In Progress => Fix Committed
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A status update is in order. We settled on a design that meets
everyone's kernel needs. Those patches have been accepted into linux-
next and they're on their way into 4.14.
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/%3C20170815220319.GA63342@beast%3E
I've submitted Artful backports to the kernel team:
** Also affects: linux (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu)
Status: New => In Progress
** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Tyler Hicks (tyhicks)
** Changed in: libseccomp (Ubuntu)
Assignee: (unassigned) =&
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Hello and thanks for the bug report. We've previously triaged this issue
in the Ubuntu CVE Tracker:
https://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-
security/cve/2016/CVE-2016-1238.html
Please watch that page for the latest information for this issue. Thanks
again!
** Changed in: perl (Ubuntu)
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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Title:
package python3-problem-report 2.20.1-0ubuntu2.10
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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Title:
I cant turn the volume.
Status in pulseaudio
Marking this bug as invalid since there's no useful information
included.
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
** Changed in: lxc (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Invalid
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Touch seeded packages, which
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to xorg in Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1706246
Title:
O Programa "Configure - Debian" entrou no modo
Hello and thanks for the bug report! To reduce the risk of regressions,
we prefer to backport security fixes to our stable releases rather than
bump them to an entirely new version of the openssh package. Please
refer to the Ubuntu CVE Tracker for known issues affecting OpenSSH:
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to systemd in Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1705158
Title:
package systemd-sysv 232-21ubuntu5 failed to
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