Bernard Miller wrote:
Instead of
.proclaiming Unicode is not to blame, it would be a
good idea for Unicode to provide some character
properties that could help an implementation reduce
spoofing.
What criteria would you use for determining these properties? How would
you determine which
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Below '#' is used to quote from the Unicode 3.2 standard as proposed
in PDUTR #28, and '' is used to quote my suggested changes.
Patches on patches
Because PDUTR #28 is a delta to Unicode 3.1, three documents have
to be referred to to reconstruct the
What criteria would you use for determining these properties? How would
you determine which characters should be identified as "spoof buddies"
(after you've gotten the easy cases like Latin/Greek/Cyrillic A out of
the way)?
If your answer is "by lookin' at 'em," then my next question will be,
Bernard Miller wrote:
Instead of proclaiming Unicode is not to blame
Unicode is not to blame. The facts of the history of the development
of writing systems the world over yields a result that you are
uncomfortable with.
Unicode exists to encode the world's writing systems
it would be
I get the impression that the so called Unicode security issues have
nothing in particular to do with Unicode, and that this
Unicode-unrelated discussion would be better off if it were held in a
security discussion list.
Jony
At 18:37 + 2002-02-11, Juliusz Chroboczek wrote:
- a cross-reference of characters whose associated glyphs are
identical, whatever the font (applies to symbols and ``modifier
letters'');
But the letter b isn't identical from font to font in Latin.
- a cross-reference of
The ICU website continues to be at http://oss.software.ibm.com/icu/
I suppose that there was a temporary networking problem somewhere.
The fact that you sometimes see internal machine names like www-124 or www-126 is due
to some misconfiguration. The ICU team does not itself control the server
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