Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-30 Thread Jeremy Harris
On 19/09/16 02:38, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > >> On Aug 22, 2016, at 10:53 AM, Jeremy Harris wrote: >> >>> draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls > ion >> Abstract >> >>The SMTP STARTTLS option, used in negotiating transport-level >>encryption of SMTP connections, is not as useful from a security >>

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-19 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On Sep 19, 2016, at 7:40 PM, Jeremy Harris wrote: > > Irrelevant. DANE provides a means for the target MX to request > encryption, REQUIRETLS provides a means for the sender to request > encryption. Both are valuable. You've lost context. I'm not saying that REQUIRETLS is unnecessary, I am

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-19 Thread Jeremy Harris
On 19/09/16 19:02, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 10:44:52AM -0700, Jim Fenton wrote: > >>> Delivery is not prioritized over security when the sending domain's >>> policy requires TLS for the given destination; or when the receiving >>> domain publishes DANE or (less reliably for

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-19 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 10:44:52AM -0700, Jim Fenton wrote: > > Delivery is not prioritized over security when the sending domain's > > policy requires TLS for the given destination; or when the receiving > > domain publishes DANE or (less reliably for initial delivery) STS > > policy. What's opp

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-19 Thread Jim Fenton
On 9/19/16 10:19 AM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: >> > In the face of DANE and STS, some users may encounter transient > difficulties with mail delivery to some domains due to security > policy and the failure of the receiving domain to correctly > maintain their certificates and/or TLSA records. > > Use

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-19 Thread Jim Fenton
On 9/18/16 6:38 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: >> On Aug 22, 2016, at 10:53 AM, Jeremy Harris wrote: >> >>> draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls > ion >> Abstract >> >>The SMTP STARTTLS option, used in negotiating transport-level >>encryption of SMTP connections, is not as useful from a security >>

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-19 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On Sep 19, 2016, at 1:02 PM, Jim Fenton wrote: > >> Sorry, have not yet read the draft, more comments at that time. >> I still think that any such mechanism needs to be able to not only >> request a greater protection for a given messages, but also to request >> lesser protection, prioritizing

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-19 Thread Jim Fenton
On 9/18/16 5:35 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: >> On Sep 18, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Jim Fenton wrote: >> >> Yes; I'm not sure why I singled out MX and CNAME because I know those >> aren't the only ways of locating the server. I would propose to change >> "confirm that any MX record or CNAME lookup used to

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-18 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On Aug 22, 2016, at 10:53 AM, Jeremy Harris wrote: > >> draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls ion > Abstract > >The SMTP STARTTLS option, used in negotiating transport-level >encryption of SMTP connections, is not as useful from a security >standpoint as it might be because of its opportu

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-18 Thread Viktor Dukhovni
> On Sep 18, 2016, at 6:47 PM, Jim Fenton wrote: > > Yes; I'm not sure why I singled out MX and CNAME because I know those > aren't the only ways of locating the server. I would propose to change > "confirm that any MX record or CNAME lookup used to locate the SMTP > server" to "confirm that and

Re: [Uta] review of smtp-require-tls-02

2016-09-18 Thread Jim Fenton
Apologies for the very late reply; this slipped through the cracks somehow. On 8/22/16 7:53 AM, Jeremy Harris wrote: > On 16/08/16 23:09, Jim Fenton wrote: >> Name:draft-fenton-smtp-require-tls >> Revision:02 > - Section 2, bullet point discussing the DNSSEC parameter: > > S