I purposely didn't even start down that road. But, Yes, they most
certainly could, and for the most part would be easier. All of the same
info rides the SigTran deployment as an SS7 A/E/F-Link, plus possibly
more depending on what type of messaging you're talking about.
However, it also
I haven't used SS7 in the voice world, only touched briefly on the
messaging side of it. Would hackers be able to do the same similar attack
via SIGTRAN? I would think it would be easier to get access to a poorly
managed SIGTRAN device which would then give you SS7 access.
Or even an Asterisk box
Joseph,
I noticed that in Gmail (and perhaps other email systems), the longer reply
I wrote for Kidd was hidden because it appeared after his text. Here's
what I wrote...
what's fascinating is the recent rise in end-to-end (e2e) encryption among
IP-based communications platforms that include
I don’t know many places that encrypt their voice traffic.
From: VoiceOps [mailto:voiceops-boun...@voiceops.org] On Behalf Of Dan York
Sent: Thursday, April 21, 2016 2:45 PM
To: Kidd Filby
Cc: voiceops@voiceops.org
Subject: Re: [VoiceOps] SS7
This is generally true if the calls are
This is generally true if the calls are *unencrypted* on VoIP...
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 2:20 PM, Kidd Filby wrote:
>
> Also folks, don't forget, the same outcome of recording someone's call is
> MUCH easier to accomplish once it is VoIP. IMHO, of course. ;-)
>
...
It's been a decade since I've touched SS7, and I barely remember what I had for
breakfast, so it's like it's all new to me again.
From what I read, it sounds like there may be a "proxy" function that can be
injected which would bring both endpoints back to you so you can record both
legs. The
You could do it by saying "hey, this handset is roaming on me" then
directing the call back to the handset in question, I figure. It would
be inbound only intercept, but i could see that working.
-Paul
On 04/21/2016 02:12 PM, Matthew Yaklin wrote:
The part I was curious about and perhaps
The part I was curious about and perhaps someone can clarify who has more
knowledge than I is...
It appears in order to record calls the attacker has to be in very close
proximity to the target. Like radio/tower range.
You cannot record a conversation half way across the world.
Matt
Thank you to everyone that provided useful suggestions. I've reached out to a
couple of recommended vendors that appear to have the solutions I'm looking for.
Brooks Bridges | Sr. Voice Services Engineer
O1 Communications
5190 Golden Foothill Pkwy
El Dorado Hills, CA 95762
office: 916.235.2097
There is no VOICE traversing the SS7 network, so you cannot possibly record
a conversation by having access to the SS7 network only.
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 9:36 AM, Matthew Yaklin
wrote:
>
> In other words the hacker has to have working SS7 trunks or access to
> someone
In other words the hacker has to have working SS7 trunks or access to someone
who does? That is how I understood it.
Not exactly a remote hack from mom's basement sort of thing.
Matt
From: VoiceOps on behalf of Peter
FYI...
U.S. carriers mum on 60 Minutes report on vulnerability in SS7 -
http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/us-carriers-mum-60-minutes-report-vulnerability-ss7/2016-04-19
Regards,
Peter Radizeski
RAD-INFO, Inc.
813.963.5884
http://rad-info.net
* Need bandwidth or colocation? call me
When was that? 1999?
Sent from my iPhone
> On Apr 20, 2016, at 10:41 PM, Alex Balashov wrote:
>
> Having seen GSXs knocked over with 100-200 CPS, I'd be inclined to even
> question that, though I don't doubt Sonus and friends make a big enough box
> for those
Avoid Meta at all cost.
Sent from my iPhone
> On Apr 20, 2016, at 10:35 PM, Paul Timmins wrote:
>
> You're going to handle 500CPS of legacy sonet based TDM and question dropping
> 7 figures on the solution? *cringes*
>
> This is literally what platforms like metaswitch,
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