RandomCookie.java: + private boolean isT12Downgrade() { + return Arrays.equals(randomBytes, 24, 31, t12Protection, 0, 7); + } + + private boolean isT11Downgrade() { + return Arrays.equals(randomBytes, 24, 31, t11Protection, 0, 7); + }
The "to" in Arrays::equals is exclusive, so please update 31 -> 32, 7 -> 8. Also, at the end of https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-28#section-4.1.3 RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH Implementations of draft versions (see Section 4.2.1.1) of this specification SHOULD NOT implement this mechanism on either client and server. A pre-RFC client connecting to RFC servers, or vice versa, will appear to downgrade to TLS 1.2. With the mechanism enabled, this will cause an interoperability failure. Has the current implementation implemented (and turned on) this mechanism? Thanks Max > > >>>> On Jun 5, 2018, at 12:12 PM, Xuelei Fan <xuelei....@oracle.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> http://cr.openjdk.java.net/~xuelei/8196584/webrev-full.01 >