Nicolas Williams wrote:

>On Mon, Feb 26, 2007 at 03:38:16PM -0800, Darren.Reed at Sun.COM wrote:
>  
>
>>Recently I was quite shocked when I looked in my .gaimrc
>>file and found that it stored passwords in clear text.
>>    
>>
>
>Yes, I know.  I have to type a password very often for one particular IM
>service too -- I have to because I refuse to let Gaim remember it.
>
>  
>
>>Then whilst reading the NWAM spec it mentioned that wifi
>>passwords are also stored in clear text.
>>    
>>
>
>Yes, but these are stored in local files not readable to joe random
>user.
>  
>

Lets see...if we assume a system prior to SBD and NFS mounted
home:
# su - nicow
$ cd /home/nicow
$ vi .rhosts
$ rsh laptop

or I could be even less elaborate (;-) if it's unpatched:
$ telnet -l -froot laptop

...now where were those wifi keys?

>...
>Applications like Gaim could also do what ssh(1) does: encrypt secrets
>in some passphrase and prompt the user for the passphrase instead of the
>actual secret.  Firefox supports this, for example.
>  
>

Right.  The idea is that rather than have n applications doing
it "their own way", provide a common API or place for them
to put said data.

>>So what I'd like to suggest is that Solaris provides access
>>to an encrypted storage "device" that applications can use
>>to put "sensitive" material in.
>>    
>>
>
>Unless that is a tamper-resistant/evident hardware token and protocols
>are used such that the secret need never leave the token in cleartext
>then you can't achieve this.
>  
>

It depends on what level of completeness is being attempted.


>...
>System applications ultimately have to store secrets in hardware tokens
>or in cleartext locally.  Scrambling such secrets doesn't help.
>  
>

I disagree.  Between those black and white options, there are
quite a few "grey" ones inbetween.

Darren


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