valdaiclub.com 
<https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-and-serbia-in-the-modern-world/>  


Russia and Serbia in the Modern World


8–9 minutes

  _____  

The Valdai Discussion Club recently held a special expert discussion on the 
situation in Serbia and the state of Russian-Serbian relations 
<https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/serbia-western-pressure-and-national-interests/>
  amid the current geopolitical conditions. This meeting expanded upon the 
Serbian issue in the expert activities of the Valdai Club,which we have 
addressed before 
<https://valdaiclub.com/events/own/russian-serbian-conference-of-the-valdai-discussion-club/>
 .

Serbia today remains practically the only state in Europe (outside the 
post-Soviet space) that, to one degree or another, maintains a dialogue with 
Russia. At the moment, Serbia has not agreed to implement the West’s sanctions 
against Russia. Between our two countries, air transit is maintained - the only 
direct regular flights between Russia and Europe outside the post-Soviet states 
and Turkey. Trade ties are developing and cultural and humanitarian cooperation 
remains at a high level. 

This special position of Serbia towards Russia has its own objective reasons. 
One of them is the countries’ shared historical memory, as our perspectives 
resonate in several key respects. One of them is connected with the events of 
the recent past, with Russia's support for Serbia and Serbian society during 
the conflicts of the 1990s, which had an especially serious impact on the 
country. During the events that followed, connected both with the dynamics 
around Kosovo and with other aspects, Russia was also firmly on the side of 
Serbia. Second, a large layer of common historical memory is associated with 
the perception of the much more distant past, both the events of the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, and the eras preceding them. Orthodox unity has played 
and continues to play an important role here. We note that this is also 
important because the current international situation shows us many examples of 
a rupture within the Orthodox world caused by geopolitical confrontation. In 
many other cases, our shared faith has faded into the background compared to 
ideological and political contradictions. In the case of Serbia, this, at least 
for the moment, has not happened. 

As a result, we can conclude that in the context of Russian-Serbian relations, 
historical memory has a direct and undeniable political significance. It 
determines not only a certain consonance in the orientations of the societies 
of our two countries, but also direct interests in political approaches on the 
part of the authorities of the two states. Thus, the Russian-Serbian example 
can be considered a testament to the fact that historical memory is actually 
the very “soft power” that is much talked about in political theory, but which 
is usually difficult to apply to the analysis of a particular political 
practice. 

However, it is quite natural in the current international situation that Serbia 
would maintain a special position towards Russia, which distinguishes it from 
all other European states outside the post-Soviet space and Turkey; 
consequently, it is now under severe pressure from the US and the EU. Serbian 
President Aleksandar Vučić has repeatedly spoken about this pressure in public. 
As a result of this pressure, in UN voting on resolutions against Russia in 
2022-23, Serbia's voice was also most often cast against Russia. Thus, the 
country symbolically stood in solidarity with other Western countries in their 
condemnation of Russia. 

Thus, out of six resolutions adopted so far within the framework of the 11th 
emergency session of the UN General Assembly dedicated to the Russian-Ukrainian 
conflict, Serbia voted “for” in five cases (resolutions ES-11/1, ES-11/2, ES 
-11/3, ES-11/4, ES 11/6), and abstained only on resolution ES-11/5, which 
called for Russia to pay reparations. Additionally, since the start of the 
current conflict, Serbia abstained on resolution 77/229 on human rights in 
Crimea, adopted within the framework of the ordinary annual session of the UN 
General Assembly. Thus, judging by the formal results of the vote, the official 
position of Serbia is not much different from the Western countries. However, 
the Serbian authorities in this case also publicly said that their position in 
the voting was due to severe pressure from the European Union and the United 
States. 

Also, the Serbian authorities have explained that the West exerts pressure, and 
the fact that they are encouraged to join the sanctions against Russia. The 
topic of possible Serbian sanctions against Russia is periodically voiced in 
the country, and not only at an informal level, but sometimes in statements by 
the country's officials. So the current state of affairs may change. 

Particular specificity in assessing the dynamics of the Serbian position on 
relations with Russia is given by the fact that both the authorities of the 
country and a significant part of Serbian society are set to promote the course 
towards the European integration of Serbia; towards its future entry into the 
European Union. At the same time, Serbia is trying to combine this strategic 
course with maintaining the special nature of relations with Russia. It was not 
easy to do this prior to the Ukrainian conflict; the Valdai Club wrote about 
this 
<https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-and-serbia-from-historical-memory-to-future/>
  in 2021. Now, due to the specifics and extreme severity of the current 
geopolitical situation, it is becoming increasingly difficult to do this. From 
a formal point of view, Serbia, as a candidate for EU membership, has the right 
to maintain a completely independent foreign policy until the moment of 
accession, and only after accession will its activities fall within the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. In fact, it is 
clear that the EU takes an active interest in candidate countries unofficially 
following the provisions of the EU Common Foreign Policy even prior to 
accession, and now this position is becoming more and more rigid. It is obvious 
that amid the current situation, Serbia's special position on Russia can serve 
as a stumbling block to European integration. Whether it is completely 
sacrificed to the strategic course of EU accession because of this, or whether 
Serbia is able to maintain the current balance remains to be seen. However, it 
is also clear that Serbia will not be admitted to the European Union in the 
immediate future in any case. In our subjective opinion, it seems that Serbia 
will not be the next candidate country from the Western Balkans to join the 
European Union. 

The Kosovo issue has also given the Serbian position certain nuances. The 
periodic escalation of the conflict between the authorities of Kosovo and the 
Serb community has, to this day, had a strong political and emotional impact on 
Serbia. It should be noted that Russia has always officially taken the side of 
Serbia in all aspects of the Kosovo conflict and continues to follow this 
policy. In our opinion, the possible entry of Serbian troops into Kosovo in the 
event of another escalation of the conflict (although permissible within the 
meaning of the relevant UN resolutions) will obviously put an end to the 
strategic course towards the European integration of Serbia. This, perhaps, can 
explain the restrained and balanced position of the Serbian leadership in 
relation to the recent bursts of escalation, as well as its attempts to resolve 
the conflict through diplomacy. Therefore, the situation in Kosovo, which is 
still far from being resolved, will continue to have a direct impact on both 
foreign and domestic policy in Serbia. 

As a result, under the current conditions, it is possible to fix a very fragile 
balance between the special position of Serbia in relation to Russia and its 
strategic course towards joining the European Union. This balance is influenced 
by both the international situation and the dynamics of the internal political 
struggle in Serbia. Where this will lead, only time will tell.

 

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