2026 will be a big year in the Western Balkans. Here’s what to watch.

[Miroslav Antic]

atlanticcouncil.org<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/2026-will-be-a-big-year-in-the-western-balkans-heres-what-to-watch/>
2026 will be a big year in the Western Balkans. Here’s what to watch.
dhojnacki
10–13 minutes
________________________________

WASHINGTON—The past year was a dynamic one for transatlantic relations, and the 
Western Balkans were no exception. In 2025, countries in the region continued 
to look to the United States, the European Union (EU), and each other for 
increased economic investment, expanded infrastructure connectivity, and 
greater regional stability. At the same time, Washington delivered several 
mixed signals about the scope and durability of its future engagement with 
Europe, while Brussels remained ambiguous about the timeline for EU accession 
for several Western Balkan countries.

If the trends evident in 2025 persist into the year ahead, then Western Balkan 
countries may increasingly need to assume greater agency in shaping their own 
trajectories. What follows is an overview of key developments in the past year 
and the issues to watch in the year ahead in this important region.

________________________________

[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/bos...@3x.png]

Bosnia and Herzegovina

For Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2025 was in part about looking to the past, as 
leaders marked the thirtieth anniversary of the US-brokered Dayton Peace 
Agreement that ended the Bosnian War. There were several notable commemorations 
of the anniversary, including in 
Dayton<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/inflection-points/dispatch-from-dayton-what-trump-can-learn-about-ending-war/>
 at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Spring Session, as well as in 
Sarajevo<https://balkaninsight.com/2025/11/21/on-daytons-anniversary-new-threats-to-bosnias-peace-guarantor/>
 and 
Washington<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/jeanne-shaheen-and-mike-turner-on-us-leadership-in-the-western-balkans/>.
 These events were marked by gratitude but also uncertainty over the country’s 
future. The agreement was never intended to be Bosnia and Herzegovina’s lasting 
constitutional framework, but it has served that function for the past three 
decades.

The past year also raised questions about the future, with the White House and 
Congress bringing a sense of uncertainty to this region by sending mixed and, 
at times, conflicting signals. Take, for example, the Western Balkans Democracy 
and Prosperity Act, which was attached to the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense 
Authorization 
Act<https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/2296> and signed 
into law in December. The act calls for sanctions on those who have “undertaken 
actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability or territorial 
integrity of any area or state in the Western Balkans.” But just weeks earlier, 
the US Treasury lifted 
sanctions<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-lifts-sanctions-bosnian-serb-leader-dodik-his-allies-2025-10-29/>
 on Milorad Dodik, Republika Srpska’s Kremlin-friendly former leader, as well 
as his associates, even though he has long threatened 
secession<https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10013/> 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

More broadly, the 2025 US National Security 
Strategy<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>
 (NSS) cast doubt on the US commitment to Europe going forward. If the United 
States reduces its engagement and presence in Europe, then Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which has relied on international support since the 1990s for its 
institutional stability and capacity for effective governance, could be 
affected. Furthermore, the NSS created more than slight anxiety in Europe with 
the veiled threat of US intervention in domestic European politics.

As it adjusts to any US changes in the year ahead, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
should also advance its own agenda. Sarajevo should, for example, aim to 
advance major constitutional 
reforms<https://newlinesinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/20250210-Dayton-Plus-BiH-NLISAP_-_-.pdf>
 and demonstrate its ability to complete major infrastructure projects. One 
such project that will test Bosnia’s capacity for governance is a proposed 
US-Bosnia southern interconnector 
pipeline<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/bosnia-us-eye-pipeline-cut-russian-gas-dependency-2025-11-20/>,
 which would reduce the country’s dependence on Russian energy by importing gas 
via Serbia, terminating in Croatia. The pipeline is perhaps the best near-term 
example of a project that, if properly structured, can strengthen Bosnia’s 
institutions and take account of ethnic minority concerns but not be beholden 
to their demands.

________________________________

[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/ser...@3x.png]

Serbia

Serbia has been rocked by student protests since November 2024, when a railway 
station canopy collapsed in Novi Sad, killing sixteen people in what the 
protesters view as a preventable tragedy resulting from state corruption. 
Whether the protesters will be successful in their demand for early elections 
is uncertain, though President Aleksandar Vučić has publicly 
alluded<https://balkaninsight.com/2026/01/06/serbia-in-2026-embattled-president-mulls-high-stakes-elections/>
 to the possibility.

While the EU has long shown greater patience with Vučić than many in Serbia may 
have hoped, the bloc’s 
statements<https://balkaninsight.com/2025/10/15/eu-chief-urges-serbias-vucic-to-get-concrete-on-rule-of-law-reforms/>
 in 2025 were increasingly stern regarding Belgrade’s arguably antidemocratic 
handling<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/775906/EPRS_ATA%282025%29775906_EN.pdf>
 of the protests. Expect this European concern to continue in 2026 should Vučić 
fail to meaningfully address these protests and their underlying causes. 
However, Washington’s perspective toward Belgrade may diverge from that of 
Brussels, as the Trump administration in September 2025 committed to a new 
US-Serbia strategic 
dialogue<https://rs.usembassy.gov/america-day-in-belgrade/>, which signals a 
willingness to find common ground and work together.

Another key issue to watch in 2026 is Serbia’s move to force Russian state oil 
company Gazprom to divest from the Naftna Industrja Srbje (NIS) refinery in 
Pančevo after it became the 
target<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/serbias-russian-owned-nis-refiner-buys-first-crude-since-us-sanctions-waiver-2026-01-09/>
 of US energy sanctions on Russia in October 2025. Removing Gazprom’s control 
from NIS is critical for Serbia’s energy and security agenda. Failure to divest 
would allow Russia to continue its effective control of Serbian energy and keep 
Serbia in US and European crosshairs when it comes to energy sanctions. 
Washington gave Serbia until March 24 to find an alternate owner; Hungary’s MOL 
Group<https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russias-gazprom-neft-reaches-provisional-agreement-sell-nis-stake-hungarys-mol-2026-01-19/>
 on January 19 reached a provisional agreement to buy Gazprom Neft’s majority 
stake.

________________________________

[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/alba...@3x.png]

Albania

Albania will likely continue to make headlines in 2026 as one of the 
frontrunners for EU accession alongside Montenegro, and hopes are high in 
Tirana that it could finish negotiations by 
2027<https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/albanias-eu-accession-sprint>. 
Albania is also preparing to 
host<https://www.kosovo-online.com/en/news/analysis/albania-host-nato-summit-2027-first-time-how-did-unimaginable-become-reality-6-7-2025>
 the 2027 NATO Summit.

However, corruption scandals among Albania’s governing elite threaten to stall 
the country’s accession progress. Last year, Tirana Mayor Erion Veliaj was 
convicted<https://balkaninsight.com/2025/11/14/tirana-mayor-set-to-run-albanian-capital-from-prison-cell/>
 of corruption and money laundering, and corruption charges against former 
Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku led to her temporary 
removal<https://www.tiranatimes.com/albania-2026-power-under-investigation/> 
from office. Further, the National Agency for Information Society (AKSHI), the 
government’s main digital and information technology body, is under 
investigation<https://balkaninsight.com/2025/12/16/eight-accused-in-albania-of-rigging-information-agency-tenders/>
 for allegedly rigging public tenders.

These developments underscore Albania’s corruption challenge and the deepening 
contest between the country’s anti-corruption institutions and its entrenched 
political and economic interests. While Prime Minister Edi Rama’s negotiations 
with the EU have been 
effective<https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/12/11/albania-is-trying-to-charm-its-way-into-the-eu>,
 these recent scandals will put his government under more pressure from 
Brussels and could potentially slow the country’s accession timeline.

________________________________

[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/kos...@3x.png]

Kosovo

Prime Minister Albin Kurti has presided over an increasingly calcified 
caretaker government and worsening relations with Washington. In September 
2025, the United States 
suspended<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-did-the-us-suspend-its-strategic-dialogue-with-kosovo-and-whats-next/>
 the US-Kosovo strategic dialogue, the key platform for US engagement with 
Pristina. According to the Trump administration, it suspended the dialogue for 
two reasons: First, Kurti’s government failed to make measurable progress 
toward creating an Association of Serb Municipalities in northern Kosovo, one 
of the terms of the 2023 EU-brokered Ohrid Agreement between Pristina and 
Belgrade. Second, Kurti has proved unable to form a governing coalition after 
his party’s electoral victory last February.

In the 
aftermath<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/balkans-debrief/will-kurtis-4th-victory-reshape-kosovos-foreign-relations-a-debrief-with-yll-sadiku/>
 of snap parliamentary elections this past December, Kurti’s Vetevendosje party 
will still need the support of coalition partners to form a government, but his 
increased share of seats in the new parliament will make this 
easier<https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/12/29/kurti-wins-breaking-the-political-deadlock/>
 than after the parliamentary election in February 2025. The upcoming 
presidential election in March of this year will be another opportunity to help 
end the political paralysis in Pristina. The incumbent president, Vjosa Osmani, 
who is known for her positive efforts to align and cooperate with the 
international community, is running for reelection.

________________________________

[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/montene...@3x.png]

Montenegro

In 2025, Montenegro drew closer to Europe, expanded economic development, and 
strengthened its security and defense posture. It closed multiple EU accession 
chapters, welcomed a European Investment Bank office, and contributed to NATO 
and European efforts to push back on Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Among Western Balkan countries, Montenegro is widely seen as the frontrunner 
for the next EU accession. While the European Commission’s 
reports<https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/9ae69ea7-81d6-4d6a-a204-bd32a379d51d_en?filename=montenegro-report-2025.pdf>
 on the Western Balkans in 2025 highlighted more challenges than cause for 
praise, Montenegro continues to advance structural reforms, increase investment 
opportunities, and modernize its military capabilities. The next EU Enlargement 
Package, expected in late 2026, will be another opportunity for Brussels to 
assess Podgorica’s progress.

Looking ahead, Montenegro will likely continue to project a European and 
regional leadership role. In June, it will 
host<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/12/17/>
 the EU-Western Balkans Summit, which focuses on EU enlargement and accession. 
And throughout 2026 Montenegro will chair the meetings and events for the 
Berlin 
Process<https://www.gov.me/en/article/montenegro-to-chair-the-berlin-process-in-2026-intensive-inter-institutional-preparations-launched>,
 the German-led initiative advancing economic integration in the Western 
Balkans. Beginning in November, it will also chair the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe, an influential post enabling Montenegro to set the 
Council of Europe agenda, promote initiatives, and provide leadership on 
sensitive political issues.

________________________________

[https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/macedo...@3x.png]

North Macedonia

North Macedonia made incremental, if limited, progress toward EU accession in 
2025. According to the 2025 Enlargement 
Package<https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/2025-enlargement-package-shows-progress-towards-eu-membership-key-enlargement-partners-2025-11-04_en>
 report, North Macedonia made some gains in rule of law, public administration 
reform, and the functions of democratic institutions. However, Skopje continues 
to hold an understandably pessimistic view of the EU accession process as 
driven more by political leverage than technical sufficiency.

In 2019, the country implemented the Prespa 
Agreement<https://www.mfa.gr/images/docs/eidikathemata/agreement.pdf>, changing 
its official name to the “Republic of North Macedonia” in exchange for Greece 
dropping its threat to veto Skopje’s accession. But North Macedonia is still 
bound by a 2022 agreement levied by the French adding additional requirements 
to overcome Bulgarian concerns by amending its constitution to recognize the 
Bulgarian minority in the country.

The results of the municipal runoff elections in late 2025, including in 
Skopje, 
solidified<https://balkaninsight.com/2025/11/03/north-macedonia-municipal-runoffs-seal-ruling-partys-triumph/>
 the political momentum behind Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski. Given this 
momentum, Skopje is unlikely to make the unpopular changes to its constitution 
in the year ahead. While the political instability in Bulgarian does not help, 
as snap parliamentary 
elections<https://www.dw.com/en/bulgaria-president-radev-steps-down-before-snap-election/a-75572086>
 will be held in early 2026 for the eighth time in five years, there is little 
prospect of significant changes or willingness to move on this issue in North 
Macedonia.

-- 
http:www.antic.org
--- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"SERBIAN NEWS NETWORK" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to senet+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/senet/PH0PR13MB54462D3652C62FB00E705182AE92A%40PH0PR13MB5446.namprd13.prod.outlook.com.