serbianmonitor.com<https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/how-much-money-is-serbia-losing-for-failing-to-implement-the-reforms-from-the-eu-growth-plan/> How much money is Serbia losing for failing to implement the reforms from the EU Growth Plan? 8–10 minutes ________________________________
Reforms in exchange for money – this is roughly the principle under which funds from the EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans are disbursed, which is why it is not surprising that the European Commission delayed Serbia’s first instalment by seven months. In mid-January, an amount of 57 million euros was finally paid. However, that is only around 50 per cent of the envisaged sum of 117 million. The reason lies in unfulfilled steps – seven reforms were promised, but only three were implemented. The approved funds related to reforms carried out back in the second half of 2024. If Serbia plans to draw the full amount of 1.588 billion euros, it will have to implement a total of 98 measures from the Reform Agenda by 2027. Funds that are not drawn by then could be permanently lost or reallocated. Such a scenario cannot be ruled out, given the current pace of reform implementation and numerous delays. And that would come at a high cost for Serbia. The European Commission (EC), incidentally, assesses twice a year – based on reports from the countries of the region – whether the agreed measures have been implemented within the stipulated timeframe and makes payments accordingly. In the decision on the latest disbursement, the EU concluded that Serbia had failed, within the prescribed deadline, to implement steps related, among other things, to amendments to media laws, the revision of the electoral roll in line with ODIHR recommendations, and the appointment of a new REM Council. Measures adopted subsequently will be subject to the next evaluation. The rules of the Growth Plan allow a maximum delay of two years for the implementation of measures from 2024 and a one-year delay for reforms from 2025 to 2027. The measures in the Reform Agenda relate to four key areas: the business environment and private sector development, the green and digital transition, human capital, and the rule of law. It should be noted that last year Serbia received only “pre-financing” funds from the Growth Plan, which are disbursed automatically and without prior evaluation of reforms. The amount in question was 111 million euros, just seven per cent of the total funds allocated to our country. Meanwhile, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia had already drawn funds on the basis of implemented reforms, with Skopje and Podgorica also receiving a second instalment from the Growth Plan. Reforms first, then money. Although the recent payment of half of the first instalment indicates that there has been some progress in implementing reforms, progress in key areas is visibly lagging behind. Moreover, the authorities daily contradict their own claims that EU membership is a “strategic goal” by taking steps that are entirely at odds with that aim. Supporting this are four full years without the opening of new clusters and chapters, and the most recent example is the adoption of amendments to a set of judicial laws proposed by SNS MP Uglješa Mrdić – a move assessed in Brussels as a step backwards on the path to the EU. Ironically, almost at the same time, an Operational Team was formed at a thematic session of the Government of Serbia, as proposed by President Aleksandar Vučić. Information has also emerged that the ruling majority has decided to initiate the process of fulfilling five additional ODIHR recommendations, alongside the establishment of a Commission for the Verification and Examination of the Accuracy of the Electoral Roll. It is also noteworthy that the reforms that have been implemented concern alignment with the EU visa regime for four countries, the adoption of a Government regulation on 5G network security, and the implementation of an electricity integration package. From this, Sofia Popović, a journalist with the “Savremena politika” portal, tells NIN, it is evident that the authorities have chosen to fulfil technical rather than political issues, as well as those relating to democratic institutions and the rule of law. The fulfilment of ODIHR recommendations to improve electoral conditions, the appointment of a new REM Council, the adoption of a Strategy and Action Plan for the Prevention of Corruption for the period 2025–2028, and the adoption of a set of media laws are still pending. The three measures that were not fulfilled in the first round, Popović says, relate to long-standing criticisms – namely, media control and unfair electoral conditions. “The fact that Serbia, from 2012 to 2023, fulfilled only four out of 171 ODIHR recommendations (of which 56 were priority recommendations) shows that the authorities are simply not interested in improving electoral conditions. It is therefore illusory to expect that this will now be done within such a short timeframe, if there has been no willingness to change this for more than a decade. This is particularly unlikely at a time of deep political crisis. Furthermore, the election of members of the REM Council indicates that the authorities do not wish to free the institutions they have captured over the past decade,” Popović points out. She says that the pace of reform implementation is worrying. Although a number of reform steps have been initiated, their completion is not in sight in the near future, Popović adds. “We have never received an explicit explanation as to why it took seven months to disburse funds for three reforms, even though Serbia requested the money back in March. Those who blame the poor state of affairs in the fundamental areas relating to the rule of law and democratic institutions are not mistaken. The basic precondition of this financial instrument, prior to the reforms defined in the reform agendas, is respect for the rule of law, transparency and the independence of institutions, an independent judiciary, media freedom… If these preconditions are not met, regardless of what is implemented within the Reform Agenda, the funds may in theory be suspended,” the NIN interviewee emphasises. How much could failing to implement the reforms cost us? While Montenegro and North Macedonia received their first payments as early as July 2025, the decision for Serbia was made only at the beginning of this year. In the meantime, Podgorica and Skopje were also paid their second instalments, and Albania received its first payment from the Growth Plan in October. In Serbia’s case, the European Commission justified the delay in its assessment by the need to “further examine the implementation of reforms”. For reforms carried out in the first half of 2025, that assessment is still ongoing, although in the case of other countries it was completed as early as October. “The Growth Plan instrument provides for a ‘grace period’ for the implementation of reforms whose deadline was the end of 2024, namely 31 December 2026. Thus, the authorities have the opportunity to implement the reforms from this first round by then if they do not wish to lose 55 million euros. Taking into account the deadlines of Serbia’s Reform Agenda, the state should by now have implemented a total of 37 measures,” Popović states. Incidentally, for reforms to be implemented by the end of 2025, a maximum of 427 million euros has been envisaged. Asked whether, given the delays, there is a real risk that the disbursement of further funds could be postponed indefinitely or irretrievably lost, Popović replies in the affirmative. “The ‘grace’ periods are there to prevent the irreversible loss of funds, so there is still a chance to implement the reforms for which funds have not been paid. However, this depends solely and exclusively on political will. The impression is that some reforms are deliberately being postponed to the end of 2026 and the beginning of 2027 for political reasons. Although the European Commission has already shown that it will not reward the simulation of reforms, we should not forget that the funds are intended to improve the lives of citizens of Serbia. For that reason, I believe that certain funds will nevertheless be allocated and that there will not be a complete suspension, but how much money and at what pace – that depends solely on the authorities in Belgrade,” Popović concludes for NIN. (NIN, 11.02.2026) https://www.nin.rs/politika/vesti/103814/koliko-srbiju-kosta-nesprovodenje-reformi-iz-plana-rasta-eu-za-zapadni-balkan -- http:www.antic.org --- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "SERBIAN NEWS NETWORK" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/senet/SA1PR13MB5442C966E84B30787565B213AE60A%40SA1PR13MB5442.namprd13.prod.outlook.com.
