On 27/5/2024 11:28 π.μ., Roman Fischer wrote:
Dear Dimitris (and all),
I don’t think that „SHOULD effective date of 15 September, 2024” is
necessary. It’s been long-standing best practice to do some form of
linting. So making it mandatory in March 2025 shouldn’t be a problem. 😊
Some CAs do not currently support pre-signed linting so there is some
engineering/coding effort to enable this type of linting. Unless people
have strong feelings about this, I will leave the proposed dates unchanged.
However, I’m wondering how “…checked for conformance with the profiles
and requirements defined in these Requirements” will be interpreted by
auditors. Do the linters have to check all the requirements of the BRs
(which IMHO is not possible), or just the “… technical conformity…”
(which could mean that the cert is conforming to RFCs)?
I didn't read the requirement to imply that ALL the requirements of the
BRs must be covered by linting software. If this is the impression
auditors might get, we need to improve the language. Are there any
suggestions?
Thanks,
Dimitris.
Regards
Roman
*From:*Servercert-wg <[email protected]> *On Behalf
Of *Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
*Sent:* Sonntag, 26. Mai 2024 09:41
*To:* Ryan Dickson <[email protected]>; CA/B Forum Server
Certificate WG Public Discussion List <[email protected]>
*Subject:* Re: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 - Pre-sign linting
Hi Ryan,
Thank you for the feedback. After some internal discussions with Corey
and Ben, please see comments inline.
On 20/5/2024 10:35 μ.μ., Ryan Dickson wrote:
Hi Dimitris, Corey, and Ben,
Thank you for bringing this ballot forward for the group’s
consideration.
A few questions:
* Given the perceived value of linting, should we consider a
stronger position on its adoption (i.e., MUST versus SHOULD)?
While I recognize that the Baseline Requirements represent
minimum expectations, consistent and reliable adoption of
linting seems to provide the ecosystem with the best chance of
addressing the problem statement described in the ballot summary.
o To accomplish this goal, the ballot could be modified to
require use of linting (either tbs certificate linting,
pre-certificate linting, or final certificate linting),
with tbs certificate linting being considered RECOMMENDED
and final certificate linting as being considered NOT
RECOMMENDED.
o This goal could be further realized by either a (1)
phased-implementation (i.e., SHOULD now, MUST later) - or
(2) a forward-looking effective date that considers a
reasonable timeline for adoption for those CA Owners
looking to adhere to the BRs that do not perform linting
today.
I see two issues here:
1. Require linting with either a phased-approach or directly with a
single effective date: I'm fine with either approach with a slight
preference to the phased-in. CAs should have been following public
incidents and m.d.s.p. discussions for years, so existing CAs
should already be doing pre-sign linting. OTOH new CAs need the
additional guidance. A CA will either have to create its own
technical tools to check their profiles accuracy or use the
recommended open-source tools we reference.
2. I'm fine with the stated preference for pre-signing over
post-signing linting but the post-signing linting should not be
"NOT RECOMMENDED" because it doesn't do any harm on its own. The
fact is that we must clearly state that the pre-sign linting is
mandatory and the post-sign linting is optional.
With that said, Ben and Corey have agreed with a SHOULD effective date
of 15 September, 2024 and a SHALL effective date of 15 March, 2025. If
people have objections to setting these effective dates, please let me
know.
* Is it worth more clearly establishing expectations for the
evaluation and, when applicable, deployment of updates made by
or to linting tools. For example, can we establish a
reasonable expectation that within 30(?) days after an update
has been made to a linting tool relied upon by a CA, it has
either (1) been adopted in the production issuance environment
- or (2) considered not applicable given the scope of recent
updates (for example, if a CA only issues DV certificates, and
the most recent update only pertains to EV certificates, there
is no expectation that the updated version is deployed).
This may open a series of questions around updates in other, more
security-critical components of the CA pipeline. I think we should
address this issue more holistically as it affects updates to hardware
firmware, OS patches, CA vendor software updates, third-party software
dependencies, switches/router firmware, and other dependencies in
Certificate Management Systems.
It is also challenging to define what an "update" is, at which level
(major, minor version), etc. I would prefer leaving that out of this
particular ballot and let someone else address it in a separate ballot
without risking the speed and success of the linting ballot. I hope
this makes sense.
More feedback is welcome before proceeding with the changes.
Best regards,
Dimitris.
Thanks for your consideration.
- Ryan
On Mon, May 20, 2024 at 2:04 PM Inigo Barreira via Servercert-wg
<[email protected]> wrote:
Hi Dimitris,
I don´t know if the “(help to improve)” is adding any
additional hidden requirement. IMO, I´d remove that.
Regards
*De:*Servercert-wg <[email protected]> *En
nombre de *Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
*Enviado el:* lunes, 20 de mayo de 2024 19:57
*Para:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion
List <[email protected]>
*Asunto:* [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 - Pre-sign linting
CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the
organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless
you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
SC-75 Pre-sign linting
Summary
There have been numerous compliance incidents publicly
disclosed by CAs in which they failed to comply with the
technical requirements described in standards associated with
the issuance and management of publicly-trusted TLS
Certificates. However, the industry has developed open-source
tools, linters, that are free to use and can help CAs avoid
certificate misissuance. Using such linters before issuing a
precertificate from a Publicly-Trusted CA (pre-issuance
linting) can prevent the mis-issuance in a wide variety of cases.
The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris
Zacharopoulos of HARICA and endorsed by Corey Bonnell of
Digicert and Ben Wilson of Mozilla.
You can view the GitHub pull request representing this ballot
here <https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/518>.
Motion Begins
MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates" based
on Version 2.0.4 as specified in the following redline:
*
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/049237e096650fe01f67780b7c24bd5211ee3038...ada5d6e0db76b32be28d64edd7b0677bbef9c2f5
Motion Ends
This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The
procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:
Discussion (at least 7 days)
* Start time: 2024-05-20 18:00:00 UTC
* End time: on or after 2024-05-27 18:00:00 UTC
Vote for approval (7 days)
* Start time: TBD
* End time: TBD
_______________________________________________
Servercert-wg mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
_______________________________________________
Servercert-wg mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg
