On 3/6/2024 12:48 μ.μ., Rob Stradling wrote:
> the CA SHOULD implement a Linting process to test the technical
conformity of the Certificate to be issued with these Requirements.
If a CA runs one or more linters during preissuance but chooses to
always completely ignore those linters' findings, can that CA claim to
be compliant with this (currently draft) ballot language?
If so, should this ballot be more prescriptive regarding how CAs are
expected to handle linter findings?
(For example, perhaps we could write something along the lines of "The
CA MUST block issuance if the linter(s) return one or more 'fatal',
'error', or 'bug' findings, and SHOULD block issuance if the linter(s)
return one or more 'warning' findings").
I didn't want to go too much into the specifics of a "Linter" because
this was supposed to be a technical/policy requirement and not a
software engineering requirement. Some in-house linters may not even
follow the logic of returning specific exit codes.
I think the requirement makes it clear that it is in the best interest
of the CA to run effective Linting software to prevent mis-issuances and
future security incidents. If a CA wants to run a linter which provides
an output signalling that "something's wrong here", and the CA decides
to ignore that warning, so be it.
With that said, I'd be happy to see if we can come up with
technology-neutral language that can address Rob's concern. I couldn't
come up with anything.
Dimitris.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Servercert-wg <[email protected]> on behalf
of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
<[email protected]>
*Sent:* 20 May 2024 18:56
*To:* CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List
<[email protected]>
*Subject:* [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 - Pre-sign linting
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SC-75 Pre-sign linting
Summary
There have been numerous compliance incidents publicly disclosed by
CAs in which they failed to comply with the technical requirements
described in standards associated with the issuance and management of
publicly-trusted TLS Certificates. However, the industry has developed
open-source tools, linters, that are free to use and can help CAs
avoid certificate misissuance. Using such linters before issuing a
precertificate from a Publicly-Trusted CA (pre-issuance linting) can
prevent the mis-issuance in a wide variety of cases.
The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of
HARICA and endorsed by Corey Bonnell of Digicert and Ben Wilson of
Mozilla.
You can view the GitHub pull request representing this ballot here
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/518>.
Motion Begins
MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates" based on Version 2.0.4 as
specified in the following redline:
*
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/049237e096650fe01f67780b7c24bd5211ee3038...ada5d6e0db76b32be28d64edd7b0677bbef9c2f5
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/049237e096650fe01f67780b7c24bd5211ee3038...ada5d6e0db76b32be28d64edd7b0677bbef9c2f5>
Motion Ends
This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:
Discussion (at least 7 days)
* Start time: 2024-05-20 18:00:00 UTC
* End time: on or after 2024-05-27 18:00:00 UTC
Vote for approval (7 days)
* Start time: TBD
* End time: TBD
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