Thanks. I’ve added a suggestion onto the PR to hopefully make this clearer.
I also added a linebreak, so as to hopefully indicate to CAs that linting alone during the self-audit is not enough to satisfy the self-audit requirements. From: Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) <[email protected]> Date: Monday, 10 June 2024 at 17:34 To: Martijn Katerbarg <[email protected]>, CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 v2 - Pre-sign linting CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. On 10/6/2024 3:29 μ.μ., Martijn Katerbarg wrote: Dimitris, I’ve got a question as to the intent of the following line from section 8.7: “Effective 2025-03-15, the CA SHOULD use a Linting process to verify the technical accuracy of Certificates within the selected sample set.” Is the intent here that the CA should re-lint the selected sample set, even if they were originally linted during the issuance process (as pre-issuance, post-issuance, or both)? Yes, as this may include a new version of the Linting software. Please let me know you have any suggested language to make this a bit more clear. Thanks, Dimitris. Regards, Martijn From: Servercert-wg <[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> on behalf of Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg <[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> Date: Monday, 10 June 2024 at 12:36 To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List <[email protected]> <mailto:[email protected]> Subject: [Servercert-wg] Ballot SC-75 v2 - Pre-sign linting CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. SC-75 v2 Pre-sign linting Summary There have been numerous compliance incidents publicly disclosed by CAs in which they failed to comply with the technical requirements described in standards associated with the issuance and management of publicly-trusted TLS Certificates. However, the industry has developed open-source tools, linters, that are free to use and can help CAs avoid certificate misissuance. Using such linters before issuing a precertificate from a Publicly-Trusted CA (pre-issuance linting) can prevent the mis-issuance in a wide variety of cases. The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA and endorsed by Corey Bonnell of Digicert and Ben Wilson of Mozilla. You can view the GitHub pull request representing this ballot here <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fservercert%2Fpull%2F518&data=05%7C02%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C7c0abb3a92ab40cdece708dc8962c3b7%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638536304511774997%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=EnKzpp7LeHvFkCrPvp4yO6L5wyOaesGa3tWnoNsf0Jo%3D&reserved=0>. Motion Begins MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates" based on Version 2.0.5 as specified in the following redline: * https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/20af1b271f2b689344ae353d3e78dc6b772199db...cc88926a3dee348a364542e5e259e9c7cab1f747 <https://nam04.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.com%2Fcabforum%2Fservercert%2Fcompare%2F20af1b271f2b689344ae353d3e78dc6b772199db...cc88926a3dee348a364542e5e259e9c7cab1f747&data=05%7C02%7Cmartijn.katerbarg%40sectigo.com%7C7c0abb3a92ab40cdece708dc8962c3b7%7C0e9c48946caa465d96604b6968b49fb7%7C0%7C0%7C638536304511788339%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=3XfLt%2BuVtEivICDoYSCYOQUmabI6yzmR2PqzKX5CXlk%3D&reserved=0> Motion Ends This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows: Discussion (at least 7 days) * Start time: 2024-06-10 10:00:00 UTC * End time: on or after 2024-06-17 10:00:00 UTC Vote for approval (7 days) * Start time: TBD * End time: TBD
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