HARICA votes "yes" to ballot SC-067 v3.
On 15/7/2024 6:29 μ.μ., Chris Clements via Servercert-wg wrote:
Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3:
This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the
Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server
Certificates(i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance
Corroboration” (“MPIC”).
Background:
- MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from
multiple Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as
described within the Ballot for the applicable validation methods in
TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5.
- Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5
will require using MPIC.
- This work was most recently motivated by research presented at
Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed
for years prior as well.
- The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for
adversaries to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks
against the domain validation processes described in the TLS BRs.
- Additional background information can be found in an update shared
at Face-to-Face 60 [2].
Benefits of Adoption:
- Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool
domain control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led
to the impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][4].
- Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of
global BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still
pose a significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6].
- Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network
perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially
reduces the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the
integrity of domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8].
- Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of
certificates a day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at
Internet scale [7][9].
Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure:
- While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers
from Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided
academic expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed
research to support Members in drafting this ballot.
- The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not
filed for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to
do so in the future.
- Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the
CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions
invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or
with the CA/B Forum.
- Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR
statement. Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has
granted a worldwide royalty free license to the intellectual property
in MPIC developed by the researchers and has made representations
regarding its lack of knowledge of any other Princeton intellectual
property needed to implement MPIC.
- The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in
Discussion Round 1.
- For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to
replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in
the Forum in any capacity.
- Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult
their own counsel.
Proposal Revision History:
- Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation
Subcommittee collaboration) [10]
- Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]
Previous versions of this Ballot:
-Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note,
some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by
other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069).
- Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15].
Note, some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates
made by other ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072).
References:
[1]
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf
<https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf>
[2]
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link
<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link>
[3]
https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600
<https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600>
[4] https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis
<https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis>
[5]
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski>
[6]
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf
<https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf>
[7]
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee>
[8]
https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee>
[9]
https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html
<https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html>
[10] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6>
[11] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8
<https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8>
[12] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487>
[13]
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5>
[14] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507>
[15]
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463>
The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan
Dickson of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable
(ISRG / Let’s Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly).
— Motion Begins —
This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline
Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4.
MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:
https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463
<https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463>
— Motion Ends —
This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:
Discussion (57 days)
- Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC
- End: 2024-07-15 15:29:59 UTC
Vote for approval (7 days)
- Start: 2024-07-15 15:30:00 UTC
- End: 2024-07-22 15:30:00 UTC
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