Fastly Votes Yes to ballot SC-067 V3. - Wayne
On Mon, Jul 15, 2024 at 8:29 AM Chris Clements via Servercert-wg < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3: >> >> This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the >> Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates >> (i.e., TLS BRs) related to “Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration” >> (“MPIC”). >> >> >> Background: >> >> >> - MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from >> multiple Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as described >> within the Ballot for the applicable validation methods in TLS BR Sections >> 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5. >> >> - Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 will >> require using MPIC. >> >> - This work was most recently motivated by research presented at >> Face-to-Face 58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed for >> years prior as well. >> >> - The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for adversaries >> to successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks against the domain >> validation processes described in the TLS BRs. >> >> - Additional background information can be found in an update shared at >> Face-to-Face 60 [2]. >> >> >> Benefits of Adoption: >> >> >> - Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool domain >> control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led to the >> impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][4]. >> >> - Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of global >> BGP attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still pose a >> significant threat to the Web PKI [5][6]. >> >> - Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network >> perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially reduces >> the threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the integrity of >> domain validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8]. >> >> - Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of certificates a >> day demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at Internet scale [7][9]. >> >> >> Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure: >> >> >> - While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers from >> Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided academic >> expertise, and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed research to >> support Members in drafting this ballot. >> >> - The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not filed >> for any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to do so in the >> future. >> >> - Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the >> CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions >> invented by researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or with the >> CA/B Forum. >> >> - Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR statement. >> Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has granted a worldwide >> royalty free license to the intellectual property in MPIC developed by the >> researchers and has made representations regarding its lack of knowledge of >> any other Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC. >> >> - The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in >> Discussion Round 1. >> >> - For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to >> replace the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in the >> Forum in any capacity. >> >> - Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult their >> own counsel. >> >> >> Proposal Revision History: >> >> >> - Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation >> Subcommittee collaboration) [10] >> >> - Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11] >> >> >> Previous versions of this Ballot: >> >> >> - Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note, >> some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other >> ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-069). >> >> - Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15]. Note, >> some of the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other >> ballots that have since passed (e.g., SC-072). >> >> >> References: >> >> [1] >> https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf >> >> [2] >> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link >> >> >> [3] >> https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600 >> >> >> [4] https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis >> >> [5] >> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski >> >> >> [6] >> https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf >> >> >> [7] >> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee >> >> >> [8] >> https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/birge-lee >> >> >> [9] >> https://security.googleblog.com/2023/05/google-trust-services-acme-api_0503894189.html >> >> >> [10] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/6 >> >> [11] https://github.com/ryancdickson/staging/pull/8 >> >> [12] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/487 >> >> [13] >> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/6d10abda8980c6eb941987d3fc26e753e62858c0..5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5 >> >> [14] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/507 >> >> [15] >> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/5224983ef0a6f94c18808ea3469e7a5ae35746e5..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463 >> >> >> The following motion has been proposed by Chris Clements and Ryan Dickson >> of Google (Chrome Root Program) and endorsed by Aaron Gable (ISRG / Let’s >> Encrypt) and Wayne Thayer (Fastly). >> >> >> — Motion Begins — >> >> >> This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and >> Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline >> Requirements”), based on Version 2.0.4. >> >> >> MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline: >> >> >> https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/c4a34fe2292022e0a04ba66b5a85df75907ac2a2..2dcf1a8fe5fc7b6a864b5767ab1db718bc447463 >> >> >> >> >> — Motion Ends — >> >> >> This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for >> approval of this ballot is as follows: >> >> >> Discussion (57 days) >> >> - Start: 2024-05-20 14:30:00 UTC >> >> - End: 2024-07-15 15:29:59 UTC >> >> >> Vote for approval (7 days) >> >> - Start: 2024-07-15 15:30:00 UTC >> >> - End: 2024-07-22 15:30:00 UTC >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Servercert-wg mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://lists.cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/servercert-wg >> >
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