On Thu, Dec 10, 2015 at 11:16:40AM -0500, Chris Lewis wrote: > There really are no technical differences whatsoever between a > blackhat and a whitehat trying to protect their identity. The ONLY > saving grace is that (in the spam space) the blackhat is forced to > resort to methods that scale high enough for an adequate ROI, while > the whitehat usually doesn't care that much.
Most spam filtering - again used in the broad sense - only cares about the identity of the sending organisation (ISP, company, etc.). And sometimes not even that. If an email body matches some (fuzzy) signature, it gets blocked, often regardless of who sent it from where. It's only when said organisation doesn't do a good enough job of checking the identity (or the hat colour) of the sender, that being able to find the actual sender matters to everyone else. > Tor, for example, being a case in point. Tor would be ideal for > spam. And it was for a bit. Slow, but worked. I don't know whether > the fact that the tor network became so slow as to be unuseable, or > that the screams from the "spammed" turned the day, but so few tor > exit nodes support outbound port 25 nowadays that it isn't a big > problem. If they hadn't all blocked that port (it's the default, I believe) then every DNSBL would add the exit nodes; Tor, by design, doesn't hide the nodes' IP addresses and it's easy to check if a certain IP address is or was a Tor exit node at a given time. Tor in an email context should be used to connect to an ISP's or corporate mail server. It's up to them to decide whether they have enough reason to believe youare a whitehat. Many believe they are able to do so, though they often require a one-time phone verification. If being able to hide (the geolocation of) your submission IP address is of vital importance, then this is the way to use email. For most people, this isn't necessary, but it is my belief that at the very least we should help organisations that wish to protect personal data for all of its users to do so in a way that doesn't seriously harm the existing email infrastructure. Martijn.
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