Precedence: bulk
WHY IS INDONESIA NOT FALLING APART?
(part 3 of 4)
by Waruno Mahdi
3. A SHORT NOTE ON EAST TIMOR.
This section will only briefly deal with East Timor. Though formally
declared a province of Indonesia by this country's highest legislative
body (the Peoples Consultative Assembly) in 1976, it had actually never
been considered part of Indonesia before.
It was not included when, at the celebration of the 10th anniversary of
Budi Utomo in 1918, Suwardi Suryaningrat (the later Ki Hajar Dewantara)
for the first time formulated and substantiated the concept of a future
independent Indonesia within the borders of Dutch East Indies.
It was not included, when presentatives of Indonesian youth from various
ethnicities pledged to one nation, one fatherland, and one language in
October 1928.
It was not considered as part of the territory to be defended against an
anticipated Japanese invasion when the most representative assembly of
the Indonesian population ever to have been convened in colonial Indonesia,
the Congres Ra'iat Indonesia, formulated its proposal to help defend
the territory of Dutch East Indies in December 1939.
It was not included when the Committee for Preparation of Independence
formulated the basic concepts that were to be embodied in the Republic of
Indonesia proclaimed in August 1945, and that were to be reflected in the
constitution published shortly after that.
It was not part of the country, for the independence of which Indonesians
between Sabang and Merauke fought with their lives from 1946 till 1949,
in some places also in subsequent years.
It was not included in the territory of the Indonesia that became member
of the United Nations Organization in 1949, and it was not part of the
Indonesia that hosted the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung and that
contributed to the setting up of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.
In a letter dated June 17, 1974, the Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik
explicitly confirmed the right of East Timor for independence, and that
Indonesia had no intentions to annex the territory.
The occupation of Balibo in October 1975, and of the rest of East Timor in
December 1975, was in flagrant contradiction with the UN Charter as well as
with the Five Principles of the Bandung Conference, both of which had been
ratified by Indonesia. So, it was also illegal by Indonesian law.
The Bali Beach Hotel declaration of September 7, 1975, (also refered to as
the Balibo Declaration) requesting inclusion of the territory into Indonesia,
served as sole legal basis for the annexation. But the East Timorese signers
of the declaration had never been legitimized as representatives of the East
Timorese population. They had no mandate to offer their country for annexation.
They were at that time furthermore completely dependent on the apparatus of
the regime for their safety and freedom. At least some of them have meanwhile
distantiated themselves from the declaration.
Thus, there are no real either legal or traditional grounds whatsoever for
considering the territory a part of the geopolitical entity known as
Indonesia, except that decision of the Peoples Consultative Assembly of
1976 based on false assumptions of a request of the territory for inclusion.
One may therefore expect that the Peoples Consultative Assembly to be newly
elected this June will repeal that misguided decision of 1976.
This would not constitute the loss of part of Indonesian, but a consolidation
of Indonesia in its authentic identity and original boundaries. East Timor's
reseparation from Indonesia would have nothing to do with a falling apart of
the country. On the contrary, the occupation of the territory against
resolute resistence of its population continuing till this day had converted
Indonesia into a factual colonial nation in total contradiction with the
constitution. Release of the territory will finally return us to our true
origins as a nation that fought for its independence against colonialism.
The regime had not only invested a great deal of material means to hold on
to that territory, it also sacrificed the lives of some 20,000 Indonesian
soldiers (no to mention some 200,000 East Timorese). As sad as this
sacrifice may be, it does not justify continued occupation of East Timor
any more, than the fallen Dutch soldiers of 1946-1949 justified continued
Dutch occupation of Indonesia. It is unfortunately just one more of the
many bitter legacies of the former regime, like the mass burials in Aceh,
or the close to one million dead of 1965-1967 in Java and Bali etc.
The only real territorial loss in the whole process, is the forfeit of former
Indonesian territorial waters south of Nusa Tenggara, which had been ceded
to Australia in 1989 in exchange for Australian recognition of the annexation
of East Timor. There, indeed, the regime had given away a part of Indonesia.
Fortunately, nobody lived there on the sea, so no part of the population was
sold out.
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There is, of course, the quetion of overcoming the problems created by the
23-year Indonesian occupation.
As a result of onesided staffing of medical and educational facilities by
personnel from Indonesian West Timor and other islands of Indonesia there
is a shortage of personnel. Many immigrants from Indonesia are also active
in trade. But one will probably be able to compensate all this this through
return of exilees from Portugal and elsewhere which, if need be, one could
temporarily reinforce with expatriate volunteers or aid-workers from
lusitanophonic countries. There will probably not be much objection against
the return from Bahasa Indonesia to Portuguese and Tetum.
Beyond that, there also seems to be sufficient supportive public sentiment
in Australia to provide help through the transitionary period. East Timor
will probably also be able to count on support from ASEAN. Offers have even
already been heard from faraway Catholic Ireland.
A more serious problem derives from the prolonged period of quite
exceptionally brutal repression, which has deeply traumatized the population.
This will be sure to reflect in public life for a certain period of time,
and tend to intensify internal political differences. But East Timor has the
advantage of an overseeably small size and the planned close accompaniment
by Portugal, Australia, and/or the UN through its critical initial period.
The East Timorese leadership has repeatedly called attention to the necessity
of a gradual transition to independence.
... to be continued in part 4
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