Precedence: bulk
WHY IS INDONESIA NOT FALLING APART?
(part 4 of 4)
by Waruno Mahdi
4. ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES.
The most serious perspectives of a possible breaking loose of parts of
Indonesia are not linked with violent unrest of the type that has
shaken Amon or Sambas, but with a desire for separation that has become
vocal in the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya.
Apart from currently effective direct reasons for separatist sentiments,
there are historical preliminary conditions that "prepared the grounds"
for such a development. The populations of both provinces already had by
reason of their particular situation in colonial times not become as
profoundly integrated as those of the other provinces.
Aceh had been the first country now incorporated in Indonesia to have
actively upheld relations with the Netherlands (an Acehnese ambassador
actually was in the Netherlands in the 17th century), but it was practically
the last to be subjugated as Dutch colony (towards the eve of World War I).
Having had a relatively developed tradition of literary and theological
scholarship of its own before that, Aceh seems on the other hand not to
have been integrated into the Dutch system of schooling as thoroughly as
e.g. the neigbouring Batak lands, Riau, or Minangkabau country had been.
The remoteness and economic underdevelopedness of Western New Guinea
(present Irian Jaya) led to only symbolic presence of Dutch colonial
administration before the 20th century. The territory continued
to be ruled as insignificant backwater all the way till World War II.
After Dutch re-occupation in 1946, it was artificially separated
from the rest of the colony for reasons that will become clear below,
leading also to its being temporarily held back at formal transfer of
sovereignty over the former colony to the independent government of
Indonesia in 1949.
Nevertheless, aspirations for separate independence in both provinces had
initially only been upheld by minorities resorting to armed actions. This
has meanwhile become different. The respective calls for a separation are
now coming from relatively large partions of the population, resorting to
prevalently peaceful means of expressing their demands.
This leads to a first reassuring conclusion, that even if the further
development should lead to separation of the one or the other of these
provinces, this will probably not happen as a result of cataclysmic
convulsions as suggested by developments in Ambon or Sambas. The problems
there are quite unrelated to the ones in the presently considered provinces.
This nevertheless does not make such an ultimate outcome of separation any
more welcome or desirable, particularly because the separated provinces
have much more to lose than a remaining rest-Indonesia.
Irian Jaya is the least prepared to take on independence. No country is
ideally prepared for independence at the moment of first acquiring it,
of course, and must learn in the process. But Irian Jaya is far less
prepared than e.g. either Indonesia as a whole was in 1945 or East Timor
is today.
Large parts of the political movement are still pre-occupied with endearingly
sympathetic visions which would not suffer a cruel awakening when confronted
with the realities of independence. They leave the political class quite
unprepared to endure and overcome the phase of political infighting that
always accompanies new independence (like 1946-1948 in Indonesia, or 1974-1975
in East Timor). The country will probably also suffer from a much more
lamentable initial inefficiency in economic management than is still reported
for neighbouring Papua-New Guinea (or for Indonesia in the 1950s).
Irian Jaya is considerably more dependent on, and structurally or organically
tied to Indonesia, than East Timor is e.g. as a result of onesided Indonesian
staffing of medical and educational facilities and Indonesian engagement
in transport and trade. Irian Jaya, furthermore, featuring a significantly
greater degree of ethnic diversity than East Timor, practically only has one
unifying language, Indonesian Malay which it shares with the rest of
Indonesia.
One will not be able to find linguistically adequate short-term replacements
like for East Timor which is also unified in the use of Portuguese and Tetum.
Resorting to Dutch, the language of the former colonial master, is now
hardly a realistic option. Withdrawal from local use of Dutch extends
over 36 years. Although West New Guinea had in the 1940s been earmarked
for later resettlement of Indo-Dutch and Eurasians from Indonesia (which
is the reason why it was held apart, as noted above), those of them who
wanted or had to leave Indonesia later chose instead to return to the
Netherlands, or emigrate to the Americas or Australia. They are not
available as volunteers for the transition through an initial phase.
Aceh seems much better prepared, and would mainly face standard difficulties
all developing nations experience upon attaining independence. It also has
the advantage of being ethnically compact, with several centuries of tradition
in the use of both Malay and Acehnese as languages with written record. It
would seem, therefore, to have the same fair chance as other such nations
of either succeeding or failing to cope with the initial trial phase and
breaking through to sustained development.
The main handicap in Aceh derives from the prolonged period of quite
exceptionally brutal repression, which has deeply traumatized a strongly
muslim puritan society, not given to relieving public sharing of suppressed
stress. At the same time there is a long-standing slumbering feud between
a traditional aristicracy and the clergy, which has remained unresolved,
and will immediately surface upon achievement of independence. Last but not
least, this most faithfully Muslim province of Indonesia is predictably
susceptible to inroads of foreign radical Islamic influences challenging
the prevailing more balanced domestic Muslim tradition. All this, but
especially the traumatized state of public consciousness, will be a
determining factor in initial independent political development.
One must also reckon with exploitation of initial political strife by
supra-national companies. In both provinces, such companies were reported
to have relied on the repressive apparatus of the regime in their dealings
with local population. Under conditions of separate independence, influence
of the companies would introduce an additional polarization between
corporate-friendly and population-friendly policy.
Any alternative way of allowing this population, and also that of Irian
Jaya, to return to a worthy peaceful and democratic life must really be
prefered to exposing it in the present traumatized condition to the test
of political infighting that invariably accompanies new independence.
But even setting aside the circumstances listed above, which seem to let
the perspectives of separate independence seem particularly hazardous,
there still is one simple consideration. Already under relatively democratic
conditions and lawful government, with adequate representation of interests
of the provinces, particularly also regarding fair sharing of revenues,
there would be no reason to want to negotiate the perilous cliffs of novel
independence even without the aggravating circumstances listed above.
Indeed, a real separation from Indonesia is probably even now not the final
will of the peoples of the provinces. The original reasons leading to
popularity of separatist slogans in both provinces was the feeling of
being discriminated. In Aceh, local business had suffered a great deal from
unfair competition of favoured outside companies having or assumed to have
special connections to the top. In Irian Jaya it is an even wider preferential
employment of Indonesians from the other islands and insufficient educative
opportunities to permit local people from qualifying. In both cases,
return to democratic government by rule of law, applying effective
measures to fight corruption, collusion, nepotism, and discrimination
promises to alleviate the grievances.
But the urgent motive behind calls for independence in both provinces was
the accumulated emotional hurt and repulsion caused by years of brutal
repression of a most barbaric nature. The brutalities of the apparatus,
provoked by small minorities waging an armed guerilla campaign, were mainly
directed against peaceable civilians. The effect was only an increase in
popularity of the respective rebellious minority.
Even initial successes of the movement for democratic reform had already
sufficed to at first markedly relax the tension, even though newly opened
opportunities for expression of opinion led to increased demonstration of
separatist demands. The preceding silence had been a force one, and it
was the pent up emotions of three decades that was breaking into the
open for air.
It was a necessary precondition for further settlement of the problems.
And already a mild official apology from General Wiranto had the effect
of drawing spontaneous reciprocal comments from the population in Aceh,
that one still regarded oneself as Indonesian patriots. Particularly the
Acehnese had all the reason to do so. They had been among the most
resolute and spirited fighters for Indonesian independence in 1946-1949.
Even in remote Dutch occupied Western New Guinea, local patriots had
struggled for independence as part of Indonesia, before and after 1949.
Unfortunately, repressive actions of the military, quite in the tradition
of the old regime, not only disavowed its own commander, but delivered a
resounding blow to perspectives of a simple settlement of the conflict.
Again, militaries shot at civilians, with resulting losses of life, in Aceh
as well as in Irian Jaya.
This leads us to the actual center of the problem. It lies not in some or
other conflict of interest between various ethnic groups, or in having
been less strongly integrated during the colonial period. It lies in a
condition of the armed forces in its quality as one of the organs of the
state, integral to its mechanisms of self-sustainment discussed in the
first section above. From a defendor of national territorial unity, it has
developed into the main factor or cause of the country's threatening to fall
apart. All it's professed efforts to ensure unity are having the adverse
effect of antagonizing the population beyond all limits.
In the first section it was noted that there has been an intrinsic shift
in the establishment standing by to the state, and this has also been
reflected in a marked opening towards democracy as manifested be leaping
improvements in freedoms of the press, of organization, of expression,
and perspectives of the coming general elections. The armed forces,
it seems, has not yet moved along with this process beyond some lip
service. They still think that shooting at peacefully demonstrating
separatists, or sentencing him to draconian prison terms, promotes national
unity rather than undermining it.
The root of this missmatch between a state in reform and its armed
forces lies in a fundamental difference between the role of the latter
under the previous military regime and under a democratically reformed
state. The issue of so-called "double function" (dwifungsi) of the armed
forces is only subordinated to that central problem.
Under the Soeharto regime, the military held ultimate political sway.
It had the last word in everything, all political and administrative
bodies were dominated by the military. Not the armed forces served the
nation, but the nation served the armed forces, that was the net
result of the take-over of power by Soeharto in 1966 with regard to
the function of the armed forces. The reform currently under process
requires a full reversal of that inversion.
Without that fundamental change, the armed forces will be constantly
bringing itself and the state as a whole in trouble. The best intentions on
the part of Pak Wiranto will be in vain. As long as his men see themselves
as the ultimate masters, his apologies can be countermanded at any time by
a lieutenant who commands "fire!".
In the organization of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), a new member must as a
first step publicly admit to being an alcoholic, to being an addict of
alcohol who is not anymore in command of himself. It is indeed impossible
to cure oneself of this addiction without first accepting that one is an
addict.
For the armed forces too, well meaning declarations of intention will not
bring any change, because it will not succeed to repair its relationship
with the nation, unless it is determined to repair its relationship to
itself. It is not a task of public relations, it is a task of redefining
its own identity. The longer it is ashamed of losing face, the longer
it will be constantly losing its face in the eyes of the people.
It is only natural, that the armed forces command will be extremely
hesitant in taking such a step. It will with certainty experience a
phase of temporary disfunctionality or at least diminished effectivity.
However, this is already partly the case even without the fundamental
reform of the armed forces. Happily, Indonesia is not threatened by
external enemies. To the North we have befriended ASEAN countries as
neighbours. To the South lies Australia which does not seem to be on
its toes, waiting for an opportunity to overrun us. Quite on the
contrary, we may probably count on all our neighbours to stand by us
in a moment of weakness.
A temporary slackening of military alertness would perhaps animate hundreds
or even thousands of Irianese or Acehnese to run into the streets and wave
separatist flags. After a while, they will go home again, nurturing a warm
feeling of pride to be citizens of a country were one may do such things.
The problem in these provinces is not one of of forcing law and order upon
the population, but of return to rule and order in government.
In the US, lots of people like to demonstrate the confederate flag, but
there is no danger of the Southern states breaking lose. In the former
Soviet union, on the other, nobody dared to show separatist symbols or
insignia for fear of severe repression. Today, all the federal republics
have broken away.
Like the alcoholic who must seek support of fellow AA members, the armed
forces will only succeed in curing itself, if it opens up to the nation
and accepts support from democratic political parties in its reform.
The best way to minimize the risk of letting the situation get out of
control, is to appeal to the local population for help: ask them to help
a repentent armed forces in its period of reformation to uphold peace.
Particularly in Aceh and in Irian Jaya, this will have a very beneficial
effect.
It is in the interest of the armed forces itself, and it is in the
interest of the entire nation, and hence also in that of the political
parties that hope to govern the nation, that the reform of the armed
forces proceeds in an efficent and orderly, but also thorough manner,
the sooner the better.
All over the world, people like to be proud of their soldiers, like to be
confident that they are always there to defend their house and hearth.
Indonesians too want an armed forces they rely on and can be proud of, all
over the country, from Sabang till Merauke.
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Waruno Mahdi tel: +49 30 8413-5411
Faradayweg 4-6 fax: +49 30 8413-3155
14195 Berlin email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Germany WWW: http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/
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