Precedence: bulk INDONESIA'S AGONY Persistent ethnic and religious troubles raise the spectre of Indonesia sinking into social chaos and even breaking up, making it hard to believe the country is simply in the throes of a democratic revolution. A new book on nationalism in Southeast Asia helps shed light on the archipelago's affliction. THE SPECTRE OF COMPARISONS: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World, by Benedict Anderson. Verso. London. $60. By Michael Vatikiotis Far Eastern Economic Review, May 27, 1999 A Balkan tragedy in Asia: Is it possible? In his new study of nationalism, Cornell University scholar Benedict Anderson offers a disquieting paradox that could be applied to the region. Borderless trade and the free movement of capital are the essence of globalization. But this influential thinker argues that they can also be a force for disintegration. "Is capitalism, in its eternal restlessness," he asks, "producing new forms of nationalism?" Capitalism generates the movement of people as well as goods and capital. Distance and exile, Anderson argues in The Spectre of Comparisons, are incubators of identity. Anderson usefully points to a simple but deadly contradiction at work in Indonesia: Economic development has not bred social integration. Just ask relatives of the Madurese migrants decapitated by their Dayak neighbours in West Kalimantan. This is a timely treatment of a complex issue. For it's not easy to convince sceptics that the current turmoil in Indonesia is simply part of a long-overdue process of political change, or that when it's over, Indonesia will become the world's third-largest democracy. The question Indonesia's nervous neighbours want answered is: What happens if it all goes desperately wrong? Will the world's fourth-largest country crumble? Or will the army step in to restore order and authoritarian rule? Disintegration scenarios loom large. Jakarta has been unable to keep far-flung mixed communities free of violent conflict. About 300 people have died in the Maluku islands since the beginning of the year in battles between Christian and Muslim islanders that are proving hard to stamp out; another 200 or so have died from ethnic violence in West Kalimantan. Separatist sentiment has been fanned by reformasi, most effectively in the former Portuguese colony of East Timor where open conflict between pro- and anti-integration forces has erupted ahead of a referendum on independence set for August. Now that independence has been mooted for East Timor, will other remote provinces with secessionist histories like Irian Jaya and Aceh follow? And if so, will other areas with strong local identities, like Maluku, South Sulawesi and even North Sumatra catch the autonomy bug? True, East Timor can be seen as unique. The United Nations never recognized the former Portuguese colony's annexation in 1975. International support for independence is accompanied by a growing domestic view that the army's mistreatment of the Timorese did nothing to make them feel Indonesian. In a recent interview in the Indonesian-language weekly Tempo, former civilian-intelligence tsar Yoga Sugama called the military's invasion of East Timor and its aftermath "our biggest blunder." As Anderson points out, because it was in Dutch hands until 1962, Irian Jaya is a more natural part of Indonesia, even though Jakarta's administration of the vast mineral-rich province since then has been at the very least, culturally insensitive. For its part, Aceh has a proud history of independence, having held out against Dutch rule until 1903. Aceh had to be coaxed into the new republic with promises of shared wealth--a promise it now wants redeemed. Separatist sentiment could spread if Jakarta fails to fairly allocate resources and allow local participation in government--a notion that supports Anderson's basic thesis. Many parts of Indonesia feel they have been denied the fruits of development to which they contributed. It is neither simply a question of administrative autonomy or money. Disrespect for Indonesia's minority cultures was a major failing of President Suharto's era. Striking examples include forcing tribespeople in Irian Jaya to wear clothes when they prefer smearing themselves with pig fat, and a bid to develop land around one of Bali's holiest Hindu shrines. Transmigration programmes which flooded outlying areas with Javanese farmers and haughty Javanese district officials promoted a sense of internal colonization--and exile--alienating local people. As one Indonesian business executive puts it: "We have not celebrated what we've always claimed to have, unity and diversity." However, the case against fragmentation is strong. With more than 300 ethnic groups scattered across 13,000-plus islands, the vast majority of identifiable groups are too small to exist as separate nations. There's also the fear that should Indonesia degrade into micro states, regional stability could be threatened by new patterns of territorial rivalry and economic competition--far outweighing new opportunities for trade and investment. "We all want Indonesia to be Indonesia. Not 40 micro states wary of each other," says Dewi Fortuna Anwar, foreign-affairs adviser to President B.J. Habibie. Perhaps history offers a guide to the future; this isn't the first time Indonesia has faced challenges to unity. The parallels to the past are striking: Indonesia held free elections in 1955, which gave no party a clear majority. The subsequent power struggle erupted in regional rebellions in Sumatra and Eastern Indonesia. Once put down, Indonesia's fleeting experiment with democracy was over and the army entered politics. But Indonesia survived intact. In his book, Anderson points out that ethnic parties did relatively badly in the 1955 polls compared with those parties campaigning on religious or ideological platforms. In the regional rebellions that followed, he adds, all except the separatist movement in Maluku were "aimed at improving the position of the ethnic group within Indonesia." When West Sumatra declared a "revolutionary government" in February 1958, it still professed loyalty to the republic and claimed the support of all Indonesians. Writing shortly before the fall of Suharto last May, Anderson asserts that "the basic character of Indonesian politics remains class conflict with ethnic politics playing a minor role." It's a view that jibes well with the post-Suharto popularity of Muslim parties. They appeal to a Muslim majority facing economic hardship with promises that political power will promote equality and a fairer share of wealth. There's no danger of a sectarian territorial divide if a Muslim-led coalition wins power. Christian communities are spread over the entire country. The Muslim political platform may even act as a binding force. Many outer-islanders felt excluded by the more secular and ethnically defined Javanese monopoly of power promoted by the Suharto regime. Indonesian unity will be sorely tested if the reform process gets bogged down and shudders to a halt in a morass of disappointed aspirations and social violence--much as it did in the mid-1950s. "If we don't manage that well, there is a danger of territorial disintegration," admits Dewi Anwar. This places a huge burden on the military, which has been thrown its greatest challenge at a time when its role and position are being questioned. Officers trained to tackle civil disturbances using live ammunition need to learn how to restore order without shooting people. Meanwhile, pressure to force the military out of politics is depriving officers of prestigious civilian appointments. Armed-forces commander Gen. Wiranto must reconcile the need for sensitivity towards civilians with a loss of prestige--and income--that could breed resentment in the ranks, and even a predisposition to revolt. It's much the same as it was in the 1950s, when a seriously divided army was slow to put down revolt, and in some cases even sided with the rebels. Anderson, as well as many Indonesian intellectuals, worry that conservatism is slowing the pace of political change--even if the military holds together and doesn't resort to old authoritarian ways. There's an implicit concern in his writing on Indonesia about the marginalization of radical alternatives. It's a familiar theme in Indonesian history. Modern Indonesia was forged in the fires of armed struggle, one of Asia's less recognized revolutions. Early Indonesian nation-building was stiffened by a radical spine--influenced by socialist thinking imported from Europe. When poorly educated army officers took charge, the anti-communist world breathed more easily, but their crude conservatism bred parochialism and ethnic prejudice--the legacy of which can be witnessed in Ambon and West Kalimantan. There is still support for the conservative lexicon of politics emphasizing consensus and compromise. Middle-class voters in Jakarta are talking about feeling more "comfortable" with elements of the old political order in coalition with untried components of the new. Wiranto is widely touted as a vice-presidential candidate. Radical politics, like that of still-jailed student leader Budiman Soedjatmiko, helped the reformasi movement germinate in the mid-1990s. Must they be put back in the bottle to temper the destructive forces unleashed since last May? A more conservative hand on the tiller sends a soothing message to investors worried about instability, but it also guarantees a slower passage to democracy--the key to cementing unity without using force. Anderson hints at this, arguing for the recuperation of radical movements "as we listen for the roll of distant thunder up ahead." Others have gone further. Before his death in February, Y.B. Mangunwijaya, a Catholic pastor who struggled tirelessly against poverty in central Java, compared contemporary reformasi to asking the Dutch governor general to resign instead of declaring independence back in 1945. He was critical of the cautious, conservative pace of change led by the Jakarta elite. "So long as they want only reformation and not transformation, there is no hope that our republic can be healed of all the perversions of the last 40 years," he wrote last November. "Virulent cancer cannot be cured with skin cream or herbs but has to be operated on." Michael Vatikiotis is the REVIEW's managing editor. ---------- SiaR WEBSITE: http://apchr.murdoch.edu.au/minihub/siarlist/maillist.html
