Below are my comments on draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-11.txt. I understand
that WG LC was just canceled, and that a new draft will be coming out
soon, but I don't think that any of my comments will be affected by the
impending changes.
1) Section 3 states:
Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the
fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field
MUST NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate.
This seems overly constraining. There should be no need to prevent
the inclusion of additional extensions as long as they are marked
non-critical.
2) Sections 3.3 and 4.5: For consistency, the profile should either
permit the use of SHA-1 or forbid the use of 1024 bit keys. Also, the
second paragraph of section 3.3 should be deleted, since the same text
already appears in section 3.8, and section 3.3 does not mention
anything about key sizes.
3) Section 3.9.5 states:
In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair.
The scope of a CRL MUST be all certificates issued by the issuing CA
unless the CRL includes an issuingDistributionPoint extension. So, if
the scope of CRLs is to be limited to certificates signed with a given
key pair, then the profile must either require inclusion of the
issuingDistributionPoint extension in CRLs or forbid CAs from performing
key rollover. The latter option may be implemented by having issuers
change names whenever changing the key pair used to sign certificates.
4) Section 4.6.2 should say that revocation date "MUST NOT be a future
date." The revoked certificates list cannot be used to list
certificates that are not yet revoked, but that will be revoked in the
future.
5) Section 5.1.1 (and several other places): The draft repeatedly states
that subject names must be "unique per issuer in certificates issued by
this issuer." While this is true, it may be misleading since it is a
necessary, but not sufficient condition. X.509 requires that names be
globally unique, so issuer and subject names must be unique within the
scope of the entire RPKI.
6) The following two paragraphs in Section 5.3 (under BasicConstraints)
seem inconsistent:
If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity
certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in the
issued certificate.
The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity
certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity
certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension.
If failure to specify a SubjectType CA bit value always results
in the issuance of an end entity certificate, why would it be
acceptable for a CA to issue a CA certificate if the subject
specifically requests an end entity certificate?
7) Section 5.3 (under SubjectInformationAccess): This section states
that the certificate request for an EE certificate MUST include the SIA
extension if the "EE certificate is intended for use in verifying
multiple objects" or the "EE certificate is used to sign a single
object". However, Section 3.9.7 states that inclusion of an SIA
extension in EE certificates is optional (under some circumstances).
Under what circumstances (if any) is it not a requirement to include an
SIA extension in an EE certificate?
8) Section 6.3: Steps 2 and 3 seem unnecessary. Including these steps
would seem require the use of path validation software that has been
customized to only validate RPKI certificates rather than allowing for
the use of off-the-shelf path validation software. What is the
compelling reason for including these checks?
9) "certificate authority" should be replaced with "certification
authority".
10) "Certificate Practice Statement" should be replaced with
"Certification Practice Statement".
11) "certificate path" should be replaced with "certification path".
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