David,

Thanks indeed for taking the time to read this draft and making these  
comments. I'll respond to them  in an  interleaved style, if thats ok,  
and I should note at the outset that my WG Chair hat is OFF my head in  
this response, and I'm responding here as a co-author of the draft in  
question.



> Below are my comments on draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs-11.txt.  I  
> understand
> that WG LC was just canceled, and that a new draft will be coming out
> soon, but I don't think that any of my comments will be affected by  
> the
> impending changes.
>
>
>
> 1) Section 3 states:
>
>     Unless specifically noted as being OPTIONAL, all the
>     fields listed here MUST be present, and any other field
>     MUST NOT appear in a conforming Resource Certificate.
>
>  This seems overly constraining. There should be no need to prevent
>  the inclusion of additional extensions as long as they are marked
>  non-critical.


The level of constraint taken here was quite deliberate.

We (the authors of this draft) did not want to be in the position of  
having certificates with extensions which relying parties may see as  
valid, but contain extensions that, were the replying party to  
understand the extension, would contradict or qualify in some wthis  
original validity.

We also took the position of minimialism over extensibility, taking  
the approach of nomination of a specific goal for the PKI, namely to  
construct a PKI that precisely matches the IP number resource  
allocation structure, and then defining a certificate profile that was  
precisely aligned to this objective.

If there is some need or requirement to use the RFC3779 extensions in  
contexts other than assertions about right of use of resources by  
virtue of an allocation action, that make use of other extensions than  
are specified here, then I would suggest that it would be more  
appropriate to define a distinct profile to fulfil this function.

i.e. this is a "particular purpose" profile rather than a general  
purpose profile, and the constraint is consistent with that level of  
specificity of purpose.


>
>
> 2) Sections 3.3 and 4.5: For consistency, the profile should either
> permit the use of SHA-1 or forbid the use of 1024 bit keys.


section 3.3 says "This profile specifies a minimum of SHA-256" which I  
thought would forbid the use of SHA-1

It also says that "Accordingly, the value for this field MUST be one  
of the OID values { pkcs-1 11 }, { pkcs-1 12 } or { pkcs-1 13 }  
[RFC4055]." which I believe that forbids the use of SHA-1 AND  
SHA-1024, or at least thats what I understand from this text.

Section 4.5 states much the same.

So it seems to me that sections 3.3 and 4.5 say the same thing.

Which means that I'm confused by your comment - when you say "For  
consistency.." my question back to you is "Consistency with _what_?" I  
would appreciate some further clarification on your comment here please.



>  Also, the
> second paragraph of section 3.3 should be deleted, since the same text
> already appears in section 3.8, and section 3.3 does not mention
> anything about key sizes.
>

Section 3.8 refers to the subject public key, and section 3.3 refers  
to the signature algorithm used to compute the signature on the  
certificate. Aren't these  referring to different things? Again, I  
would appreciate some further clarification on your comment here please.


> 3) Section 3.9.5 states:
>
>     In this profile, the scope of the CRL is specified to be all
>     certificates issued by this CA issuer using a given key pair.
>
>  The scope of a CRL MUST be all certificates issued by the issuing CA
>  unless the CRL includes an issuingDistributionPoint extension.  So,  
> if
>  the scope of CRLs is to be limited to certificates signed with a  
> given
>  key pair, then the profile must either require inclusion of the
>  issuingDistributionPoint extension in CRLs or forbid CAs from  
> performing
>  key rollover. The latter option may be implemented by having issuers
>  change names whenever changing the key pair used to sign  
> certificates.

I just read rfc5280 again (well, section 5 at any rate), and I  
personally cannot see a justification for your assertion that an  
issuingDistributionPoint MUST be used if the scope of a CRL is limited  
as stated in section 3.9.5. My reading of rfc5280 suggests that it is  
possible to have a restricted scope, and still not have an  
issuingDistributionPoint extension in the CRL.

As you are a co-author of 5280 it could well be that my reading of  
rfc5280 is incorrect.

Perhaps if I put it as a question:

    IF a CA wishes to limit the scope of a CRL MUST the CRL use the  
IssuingDistributionPoint extension EVERY time in EVERY CRL?

How would section 5.3.1 of rfc5280 then apply given that the reason is  
essentially "unspecified" and  5.3.1 states: "the reason code CRL  
entry extension SHOULD be absent instead of using the unspecified (0)  
reasonCode value."

The other option is to place no scope restriction on CRLs, which leads  
to the potential for a CRL signed by CA's Key B to revoke a  
certificate issued by CA's Key A. Does this "no scope" present a  
problem at all?

>
> 4) Section 4.6.2 should say that revocation date "MUST NOT be a future
> date."  The revoked certificates list cannot be used to list
> certificates that are not yet revoked, but that will be revoked in the
> future.

You are suggesting s/SHOULD/MUST/ here - is that right? This change  
looks sensible to me as it should reflect a past event not a future  
intention.

So I agree with this suggested change to the text.

>
>
> 5) Section 5.1.1 (and several other places): The draft repeatedly  
> states
> that subject names must be "unique per issuer in certificates issued  
> by
> this issuer." While this is true, it may be misleading since it is a
> necessary, but not sufficient condition.  X.509 requires that names be
> globally unique, so issuer and subject names must be unique within the
> scope of the entire RPKI.
>


I cannot see this uniqueness requirement mentioned anywhere in RFC5280  
- if this is a requirement then why is this requirement omitted from  
rfc5280? In the RPKI a single entity may hold resources from multiple  
sources, and therefore it is conceivable that the same subject has  
resource certificates issued by multiple CAs. in this case we were  
desirous not to force different subject names onto the same entity  
when the RPKI makes no use of distinct subject names in any case. For  
that reason uniqueness of the subject name was qualified as you quote  
- unique per issuer only.



> 6) The following two paragraphs in Section 5.3 (under  
> BasicConstraints)
> seem inconsistent:
>
>       If this is omitted then the CA will issue an end entity
>       certificate with the BasicConstraints extension not present in  
> the
>       issued certificate.
>
>       The CA MAY honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity
>       certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity
>       certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension.
>
>   If failure to specify a SubjectType CA bit value always results
>   in the issuance of an end entity certificate, why would it be
>   acceptable for a CA to issue a CA certificate if the subject
>   specifically requests an end entity certificate?
>


It is not acceptable, nor is it intended in the text that this was a  
possible outcome.

are you suggesting that there should be a s/MAY/MUST/ ?

i.e.:


      The CA MUST  honour the SubjectType CA bit set to off (End Entity
       certificate request), in which case the corresponding end entity
       certificate will not contain a BasicConstraints extension.


if this is your comment, then I agree with this.


> 7) Section 5.3 (under SubjectInformationAccess):  This section states
> that the certificate request for an EE certificate MUST include the  
> SIA
> extension if the "EE certificate is intended for use in verifying
> multiple objects" or the "EE certificate is used to sign a single
> object". However, Section 3.9.7 states that inclusion of an SIA
> extension in EE certificates is optional (under some circumstances).
> Under what circumstances (if any) is it not a requirement to include  
> an
> SIA extension in an EE certificate?

When there are to be no published outcomes that are signed by this EE  
certificate. For example, when the EE certificate is used to digitally  
sign a single object that is not to be published in any repository.

>
> 8) Section 6.3: Steps 2 and 3 seem unnecessary. Including these steps
> would seem require the use of path validation software that has been
> customized to only validate RPKI certificates rather than allowing for
> the use of off-the-shelf path validation software. What is the
> compelling reason for including these checks?

step 2 says that the wall clock should be within the validity times of  
the certificate - this does not appear to represent any change from  
the conventional interpretation of the validity times of the  
certificate.

step3 says that valid PKI certs should conform to this profile. Again  
this does not appear to be unusual.


>
>
> 9) "certificate authority" should be replaced with "certification
> authority".

agreed

>
>
> 10) "Certificate Practice Statement" should be replaced with
> "Certification Practice Statement".
>

agreed

> 11) "certificate path" should be replaced with "certification path".
>

agreed


again, thanks indeed for these comments

regards,

   Geoff - who is NOT posting as wg chair in this response.


_______________________________________________
sidr mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr

Reply via email to