Samuel Weiler wrote: [...]
What would we need to do differently in the RPKI design to prevent capture and control?
I'm sorry for pointing out the obvious, but in _any_ system where you receive a certificate from someone else -- like it or not -- that someone else will have the means of revoking your cert, or not renewing it. As simple as that. It can be an error, a bug, and (horrible dictu) abuse of power, the real cause ultimately doesn't really matter.
So you either certify yourself -- which is, IMO exactly as useful as not certifying at all --, or actually trusting your parent. So maybe the appropriate question is who to trust in this scenario? Someone who actually _knows_ what resources you hold at the moment, or someone who may have some idea about it, or maybe not, but definitely would _like to be_ your parent here for a reasonable sum?
The answer is pretty obvious to me. Robert _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
