On Tue, Sep 22, 2009 at 01:13:09PM -0400, Christopher Morrow wrote: > For grins, what about RADb running this service? (or the existing set > of IRR's) What sort of implications does this have for stability and > cleanliness of the data? Can we be anymore assured of having > up-to-date data in the CA heirarchy than we can in the current IRR > databases? If we can't be assured of that, how valuable is this new > regime?
Actually the RADb may be a very appropriate place to run a CA. Another
possibility is some subset of the existing certificate providers. They
understand the PKI stuff, they would have to develop the verification
procedures.
Btw. It isn’t clear to me that the data needs to be super clean to be
useful. It has to contain all the information needed for routes to
work, but if it has extra crud, that isn’t really a problem as long as
your goal isn’t data purity but instead making it harder for “bad
guys” to hijack blocks.
-Jeff
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Jeffrey I. Schiller
MIT Network Manager
Information Services and Technology
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
77 Massachusetts Avenue Room W92-190
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
617.253.0161 - Voice
[email protected]
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