Responses inline.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sandra Murphy [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Tuesday, April 06, 2010 1:49 PM
>
> Comments in line.
> 
> On Tue, 6 Apr 2010, Sriram, Kotikalapudi wrote:
> 
> >> ....
> >> So, for a wild example, suppose the validation check looked to see if one
> >> single AS in the origin AS_SET matched a valid ROA for the prefix, and
> >> passed the BGP route as valid.  That would give a malicious person a way
> >> to ensure that their bogus route would be accepted.  If on the other hand,
> >> the validation code looked to see if all ASs in the AS_SET matched a valid
> >> ROA, that might break legitimate uses.
> >> ....
> >> --Sandy
> >
> > Sandy's hypothetical attack example as well John's original message made me 
> > think about
> > enumerating all the use-case scenarios for {Prefix, Origin} validation with 
> > AS-sets.
> <snip>
> >
> > There are two essential things that the address-resource owner needs to be 
> > made aware of
> about validation:
> > 1. In the long run, when deployment is deemed complete, an update with an 
> > AS set will
> be considered Invalid except in cases A3, B3, and C3.
> > 2. NO concession is made during validation by way of aggregation of more 
> > specific
> prefixes in ROAs to "effectively" create a ROA for a less specific prefix.
> > Example: Existence of the following four ROAs, namely, ROA-1: {10.1.0.0/18,
> AS64496}, ROA-2: {10.1.64.0/18, AS64497}, ROA-3: {10.1.128.0/18, AS64498}, 
> ROA-4:
> {10.1.192.0/18, AS64499} WILL NOT by itself result in positive validation of 
> an update
> that has the aggregate prefix 10.1.0.0/16 with the AS set {AS64496, AS64497, 
> AS64498,
> AS64499} as origin.
> 
> You seem to be presuming specific validation outcomes here.  I'm not
> saying you are wrong, but I'm not certain the use cases document should be
> saying ANYTHING about the validation algorithm.

You are right. ONLY the use cases will be recorded in the use case document.
Nothing needs to be said there about the algorithm or validation outcomes.
I mentioned some example validation decisions (which I think are inline
with the current approach in the ROA validation documents)
only to help further this email discussion. 
  
> 
> I also don't know if we have a consensus of the security concerns with
> AS_SETS to be making presumptions about the validation outcomes.  It
> appears that John, for one, does not care for the roa-validation draft's
> suggested outcome.
> 
> As wg chair, I'd appreciate some more discussion on what to do with
> AS_SETS.  Jump in any time folks.  As I tried to say yesterday, the object
> here is to avoid leaving a hole in the spec implementers would have to
> imaginatively fill, creating inter-op problems and maybe a vulnerability.
> 
> About point 2:  There is this thing called "proxy aggregation" where an
> ISP discovers two external peer BGP routes that are aggregatable and
> announces the aggregate.  Long long ago, IIRC, we decided that proxy
> aggregation was too hard and too rare and we would declare it out of
> scope.  Your point 2 would specifically disallow proxy aggregation.  Not
> saying that's a bad thing, for a feature that was declared out of scope.
> Just warning about the side effect.

My point 2 was not to say that proxy aggregation would be disallowed.
In that example, if the prefix owner of 10.1.0.0/16 wants the proxy aggregation 
to pass the ROA validation, then they should be aware enough to create four ROAs
for the _aggregate_ prefix (/16) as follows:
ROA-5: {10.1.0.0/16, maxlength =18, AS64496},
ROA-6: {10.1.0.0/16, maxlength =18, AS64497}, 
ROA-7: {10.1.0.0/16, maxlength =18, AS64498}, 
ROA-8: {10.1.0.0/16, maxlength =18, AS64499}.
That is, they should not merely create ROAs for the more specifics
as stated in my point 2 above, and hope that the router
algorithm will magically combine the ROAs for the more specifics
and hence figure it out that the proxy aggregation is OK.
No ... they should know that will not work. 
The way to make it work is to create ROAs for the aggregate
as illustrated in ROA-5 through ROA-8 above.
With this set of ROAs for the aggregate, the four
ASs listed above can still originate the more specifics (/18s),
and when an upstream ISP's AS does proxy aggregation, then
that proxy aggregation will pass ROA validation.
That is what I think we want to happen.
It is just a matter of cautioning the user and their ISP about what specific 
ROAs they should create if they wish to do proxy aggregation.

Sriram
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