Sriram, Kotikalapudi wrote on 13/4/10 12:40 AM:
[...]

> This approach (such as the one I proposed above) prevents an adversary 
> from taking advantage of AS_SET to try get past the validator. 
> And in most cases involving AS_SETs (referring again to Danny's data),
> we would be able to decisively evaluate the update as "Valid" or "Invalid" 
> when a covering ROA exists for the prefix.
> Not much shoehorning is involved as I see it
> (unless I am missing something).
>

I agree with Geoff's point that proper handling of cases of proxy
aggregation depends on the requirements of as-path validation.

But at the current stage of SIDR work, since ROAs do not really protect
against anything malicious, I am more in favour of the original
validation process as stated in draft-ietf-sidr-roa-validation-05. I
think that in reality aggregation is not coincidental and relates to the
fact that the aggregator has the rights to use of the address space of
the covering prefix, and, therefore, is the only one able to issue the
appropriate ROA.

Andrei
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