Hi, Geoff

At Tue, 27 Apr 2010 14:07:30 +1000, Geoff Huston wrote:
> 
> I dug out the original exchange from 3 June 2007 and I think you were
> proposing some complications to the mechanism at the time....

No doubt.  Thanks for the archives, I had forgotten some of the
details, but I still think that we (for some definition of "we") went
a bit overboard at the time.

You're correct that perfect avoidance of all possible replay would
require a counter or clock that increments at least as fast as the
signing rate, whatever that might be.

On the other hand, for the one attack I know of at the moment (replay
of an old issuance request with a compromised key after that key has
been revoked), a clock check with one-second granularity is almost
certainly good enough: for this attack to work in this case, the
revocation request would have to come less than a second after the
initial issuance request, which seems unlikely.

The nanosecond timer isn't quite the same thing as the sequence number
I was talking about yesterday: the sequence number would be intended
to catch dropped messages, a timer wouldn't do that.  Interesting that
Steve Bellovin seems to have been advocating the clock-based approach
back when as a way of avoiding state; he was correct about that, of
course, but he's also the person who suggested the sequence number
this time, so I may need to get him into an argument with himself to
find out who wins that one.

In any case: I still suspect that the trivial timer check I proposed
yesterday would suffice for the one attack we know about today.
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