> Randy, can you elaborate on the nature of current IANA allocations > made to non-RIRs? Legacy allocations are not addressed in this > paragraph, just the current allocation system.
we're talking about certs. iana will be issuing certs for those allocations, whether legacy, strawberry, or cowboy junkies. > The intent is to help ensure that each CA (as amended below, in 2.2) > has a CPS nice intent. i am not sure it will be met and not sure it MUST be for the internet to keep working. maybe a SHOULD is more realistic. > - 3.1.2: I disagree with Randy's recollection of the history of this > requirement. First it was no meaningful names for any subject other > than IANA and the RIRs. then you came in late. the IANA/RIR was a wg proposal you made in san fran, i think, about two years into this. > NEW: The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD not be "meaningful", > i.e., the name is NOT intended to convey the identity of the > Subject to relying parties. The rationale here is that > certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in > support of applications that make use of attestations of > INRs. They are not used for to identify Subjects. wfm > NEW: When generating subject names, CAs SHOULD use a mechanism (such as > those described [cert-profile]) to minimize the likelihood that > the subject name is a trademark, service mark, etc. why not stick to has no meaning? mentioning trade/service marks is an unnecessary invitation to people we would rather not have to talk to about this stuff. > NEW: It is RECOMMENDED that the renewed certificate be issued and > published at least 24 hours prior to the expiration of the > certificate that it replaces. and hopefully considerably earlier. if i am four down the chain, and someone a hop or two up has a cert soon to expire, that 24 hour window is a great cause of unnecessary adrenaline. if you have a time there, i would prefer a week, especially considering long processing cycles discussed by rirs. > NEW: Each CA MUST maintain procedural security controls that are > commensurate with those employed by the organization in the > management of INR distribution. The procedural security controls > employed for CA operation MUST be specified in its CPS. Possible > topics to be covered in the CPS include: > > - 5.4.1: I think Sean addressed Randy's question here. not to my satisfaction > - 6.3.2: Randy and Geoff do not agree on whether/how to change this. hmmm, i honestly do not remember. but i must be right because geoff is more jet lagged. :) > NEW: The INRs held by a CA may periodically change when it receives > new distributions. To minimize disruption, the CA key MUST NOT > change when INRs are added to it's certificate. i do not have enough coffee (and it is dishwater here in the icnp conf hotel) to think this through. but isn't my parent the one who adds the new resources to my cert? so you are telling me that i need to coordinate submitting a req to change my key with an unknown time when my parent decides to give me resources? as i said, need caffeine. randy _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
