> I think, that today you receive a route in BGP, you believe it's > proper and pass it on. you have no real way to tell if the route was
Isn't this what NO_EXPORT is for? Is the entire point of this exercise to encrypt one community? > originated by the ASN in the first (last? right-most) AS hop, you have > no real assurance that the prefix-list you used to fllter the route is > actually correct, and you have no understanding of the path seen in > the as-path aside from what the text says. (see pilosov/kopella) What sort of policy do you want to infer from the as path beyond the first hop? This is what needs to be in the requirements draft. Come'on, you're a provider! Don't think about what you want the protocol to look like, think about what you want the protocol to accomplish! You stated one thing above, but that really needs some clarity around it --what policies do you think you can infer from the AS Path? For instance, given this: A---------B | | +---C-----+ Is the point for B to be able to control whether or not A accepts routes from C? In other words, is the point to control A's policy towards C, or to inform A of your policy towards C? Can you actually inform A of your policy towards C without telling A what your policy towards C is? :-) Russ
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