Randy, On Feb 22, 2011, at 20:11 MST, Randy Bush wrote: >> If we have already authenticated the route origin, with either offline >> or online enforcement depending on your preference, we have >> cryptographically bound a route object to an aut num. > > btw, the sidr work to date has not formally bound the route origin. it > is informal, and easily spoofed. the sidr work to date only deals with > the simple fat finger problem.
Can you clarify what you mean by "the sidr work to date has not formally bound the route origin ... and [is] easily spoofed"? I thought the entire goal of the RPKI and, more importantly, the objects that it holds attest to the 'authorization' to originate a route? In particular, I refer to the following in Section 3.1 of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-arch-12: ---snip--- A ROA is an attestation that the holder of a set of prefixes has authorized an autonomous system to originate routes for those prefixes. A ROA is structured according to the format described in [ROA-FORM]. The validity of this authorization depends on the signer of the ROA being the holder of the prefix(es) in the ROA; this fact is asserted by an end-entity certificate from the PKI, whose corresponding private key is used to sign the ROA. ---snip--- Perhaps there's a subtle _security_ nuance that I'm missing in your statement? Thanks, -shane _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
