Unfortunately, that change shifts things just enough to miss an
important part of what I was hoping to achieve.
While it is true that we can not know why anyone does anything, the
reason we care about it is that certain kinds of path falsification can
result in traffic being lured to places that any reasonable model of
authorization (not necessarily just the strict mathematical sense, but
the more general operational sense) says it aught not go.
The purpose of the whole exchange was to try to get a motivation into
the picture, rather than just another assertion that we want to protect
the AS path. There is no need for new text just saying "we are
protecting the AS path because we are protecting the AS path."
Yours,
Joel
On 3/2/2011 4:59 PM, Randy Bush wrote:
i could make it something like
3.1 A BGPsec design MUST allow the receiver of an announcement to
detect that one or more ASes have manipulated the AS-Path in an
attempt to lure the receiver into sending traffic to an incorrect
next hop.
in a private email, a friend pointed out that we neither know nor do we
care why charlene falsified the path. the point is that we must be able
to detect that she did.
so the wording i think i'll go with is
3.1 A BGPsec design MUST allow the receiver of an announcement to
detect that one or more routers have falsified the AS-Path.
last chance for word-diddling.
randy
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