Le 31/03/2011 13:22, Randy Bush a écrit :
As a provider I have the same point of view as Randy. But then when we talk about first deployments, it can be harmful to reject UPDATE messages because there is some problem with the signature of the prefix in a legitimate announcement. That's where the draft on security state diagnostic message by Alvaro and Robert can be interesting in debugging such cases. However, I will tend to limit the scope of such messages only to information pertaining to the neighbouring AS (ie the prefixes it originates and maybe in the future the AS_PATH its has signed, and not the prefixes signed by a 5-hop-far AS).[ let's try again ]I don't want to shut the door completely, I like having a choice.you have the choice. i hope all my competitors accept invalid routes
Greg
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