On Tue, May 31, 2011 at 11:26:05AM -0700, Joe Touch wrote: | | | On 5/31/2011 11:19 AM, Hannes Gredler wrote: | >On Tue, May 31, 2011 at 10:56:52AM -0700, Joe Touch wrote: | >| | >| | >| On 5/31/2011 10:52 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote: | >|>On May 31, 2011, at 10:23 AM, Randy Bush wrote: | >|> | >|>>>1. Maybe add to section 5.9 "An Error Report PDU MUST NOT be sent for | >|>>>an Error Report PDU.". | >|>> | >|>>makes sense | >|>> | >|>>>To answer the initial request, it seems reasonable to specify "the | >|>>>length of the Arbitrary Text of Error Diagnostic Message MUST NOT be | >|>>>longer than 200 octets". That keeps the length of the entire PDU under | >|>>>the semi-magic 256 octets for the current version of the protocol | >|>> | >|>>in what way is 256 octets semi-magic? | >|> | >|>C or assembly-based implementations will need to malloc (etc.) the | >|>buffer for the incoming message. Having that fit into 256 octets could | >|>easily have some value to some implementations. There is no security | >|>problem if the cache ignores such a MUST and makes the message longer | >|>because the length is given the PDU. (Having said that, I hope router | >|>implementers of this protocol are being robust in checking the lengths | >|>in this PDU; I can already see ways to craft malicious versions of this | >|>PDU that might trigger a buffer overflow...) | >| | >| These are good reasons for robust implementations to check for the | >| message length and read only as much as the currently allocated | >| buffer allows, reading more in as needed. | > | >wonder what the normative procedure is for "too-large" messages ? | > | >my pre-standard implementation has an inbound buffer of 4K | >and resets the session if it encounters a PDU length of> 4K. | | That makes an easy DOS attack.
i fail to see why max-PDU size spelled out in a protocol-spec is a pre-cursor to a DOS attack. as long as the message integrity of your TCP session is preserved (e.g. MD5, AO) its perfectly letigimate to flap a session if i do not like what i see. | It's better to: | | - allocate a 4K (or whatever value you want) buffer | - read up to the first 4K | - check to see if there's more to read, and allocate more buffer | space or read it into the first buffer (after the first 4K has been | parsed) i am not so sure about wether the above is really "better", since there is a price to pay. in the above you are assuming that each input parser is a true "stream parser" such that the entire parsing context is saved when e.g. a PDU is scattered across two buffers. e.g. consider an IPV4 Prefix where the first part is in buffer #1 and the reminder is in buffer #2. --- Buffer 1 [ ... ] .-------------------------------------------. | Protocol | PDU | | | Version | Type | reserved = zero | | 0 | 4 | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Length=20 | | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | Prefix | Max | | | Flags | Length | Length | zero | | | 0..32 | 0..32 | | +-------------------------------------------+ | | | IPv4 Prefix | | | +-------------------------------------------+ --- End of Buffer 1 Buffer 2 +-------------------------------------------+ | | | Autonomous System Number | | | `-------------------------------------------' [ ... ] lets further assume that between reading buffer 1 and buffer 2 there is a time lag (e.g. the socket just got flow blocked). now you need to save your previous parsing results up until the socket becomes readable again. with max-PDU sized recv buffers the whole story gets a whole lot simpler, as you can avoid the context saving for each and every input parser: you just need to ask. 1. do i have enough data in the buffer for reading the PDU header ? 2. if so does the message exceed the recv buffer ? 3. do i have enough data in the buffer for parsing an entire PDU ? | Either way, there's no reason for a *protocol action* to deal with a | receiver buffering issue. i find less code-complexity in input parsers a quite compelling argument. _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
