On Wed, 10 Aug 2011, George Michaelson wrote:


On 10/08/2011, at 11:34 AM, Danny McPherson wrote:


On Aug 9, 2011, at 9:23 PM, George Michaelson wrote:


You seemed to be saying "some people are saying beacons wont work"


<snip>


I said it in part, because AS_SET has gone, precisely because its just too hard to do in 
BGPSEC, as I understand it. The justification is "its not useful" but its 
removed because of its impact on the emerging protocol modifications.

Speaking of my view of the discussion, AS_SETs presented difficulties in origin validation, without consideration of path validation. The topic has come up many times in the wg. In 2010, and in the Beijing meeting in particular, we (energetically) discussed various aspects of validating an origin for AS_SETs. The eventual decision was to abandon determining the origin AS for AS_SETs.

--Sandy



I am still struggling to understand how Path prepend is going to work. What I 
heard suggests its going to have to be administratively constrained to be 
sign-able. At the edge its more in the hands of the origin AS but beyond that 
where does the permission to play with the path come from?

(again, I may have misunderstood)


Its very probably an unfair question. Thats why I called it the peanut gallery.

If it makes any difference, I think Randy both proposed beacons, and made a 
compelling case for removing them.

I guess I live in a margin where they are  research TOOL and you sometimes 
remove TOOLS. If they were added for another purpose, what I get from them 
(which is not much btw, but they get talked about in my hearing) is not the 
core motivation.

What they seem to do, is help confirm people are seeing BGP state. So they add something 
to the question "do I see the same kind(s) of BGP you see". Maybe thats not 
enough justifier.

-G
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