On Fri, Nov 4, 2011 at 8:59 PM, Randy Bush <[email protected]> wrote: >> Point being that in cases like this (or really all route leak cases) >> the only thing that stops this is filtering routes between bgp peers. >> (transits, customers, SFP peers) There isn't anything in the protocol >> itself (which is Stephen's, Russ's, Randy's comment through out) that >> tells you/me/them that 12989 should not be permitted to announce this >> route. (looking at available data, it seems that they SHOULD, perhaps >> not with this ASPath, but...) > > we can not know intent. > > to take it to one extreme, did the pakistani operator mean to 'leak' > youtube's prefix or not? >
right, the only save there is the filtering PCCW was not doing... which was my point (I believe) > randy > _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
