On Jan 18, 2012, at 4:11 AM, Tim Bruijnzeels wrote: > Hi, > > On Jan 18, 2012, at 12:36 AM, Eric Osterweil wrote: >> 2 - How do we envision the process of an AS getting its own private key >> information installed on all of its routers?* Without _these_, updates >> cannot be signed... > > I don't know for a fact, but I expect that the router key pair is created on > the router itself. The private key never leaves it, but the public key can be > exported so that it can be put on a (EE?) certificate signed by the holder of > the AS.
I think this is one of the things that I was afraid of (though I may still be in the weeds). If (on one extreme) every router in an AS creates its own pub/priv key pair, then an AS w/ ~10^3 routers will need to publish ~10^3 keys, and consuming/verifying routers will need to have ~10^3 public keys in their extended memory hierarchies to verify any possible prefix/signature combination. It sounds like we may need routers to manage key sets on the order of the number of _routers_ in the global routing system rather than the number of ASes in order to be able to verify all of crypto sigs that may be encountered on updates... > > I have to admit though that I am not fully up to speed with all the bgpsec > documents, it's somewhere on my todo list, but my main focus here has been on > publication and validation related matters, not so much bgp and router.. Understood. I have not ruled out the possibility that my confusion stems from not being current enough with one of the drafts that happens to address this... Though, I wonder if that is also a point worth making. Maybe there are just too many drafts, and that needs to be addressed? ;) Eric _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
