At 10:39 PM -0500 1/19/12, Eric Osterweil wrote:
...
>
Even if there are many fewer certs, inconsistent caches would pose
a problem. Unless we're discussing an emergency rekey for a cert,
the smart procedure is to post a new cert well before the old one
expires, allowing RPs to retrieve the new one in plenty of time.
Yeah, I agree with your comment about getting keys out ahead of
time. However, with a corpus of keys that could well order in the
millions, I would worry that the inherent churn and resource
requirements are going to be well more than we are (or at least I
was) expecting.
speak for yourself :-).
> There is not yet an operational guidance doc for router cert
management, but
I anticipate this sort of guidance will appear there.
Will it include some discussion about scaling? I think this
key-per-router idea could turn out to be Pandora's box. While
having a key or two per AS or per prefix may allow us to use
elements of today's routing system to give us some idea about how
churn and dynamics _may_ look, I'm kind of worried now that we
haven't properly evaluated how enormous the resource dependencies
will be with per-router-keys. Are there any specific plans to write
this up anywhere?
I anticipate that an operational considerations doc will be written.
Steve
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