At 11:50 AM -0400 3/21/12, Brian Dickson wrote:
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 at 11:37 AM, Montgomery, Douglas
<<mailto:[email protected]>[email protected]> wrote:
By "we" I assume you are asking the bigger question about what the broad
requirements / objectives should be.
The current BGPSEC design, chooses to only focus on the protocol on the
wire, and starts with the attributes that had both an identified threat
and a existence proof of a reasonable mechanism to address that threat.
If that statement were true, I think there would be much more
support and progress
for the bgpsec-protocol component of the SIDR WG.
However, the current interpretation (by whom, is not clear) seems to be,
that only certain attributes (AS-path and nothing else?) are
included in what is protected.
The WG charter states which BGP vulnerabilities are to be addressed.
The choice of which attributes need to be protected is, I believe,
consistent with the charter.
Steve
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