Sorry to interject, but... On Mar 21, 2012, at 3:01 PM, Stephen Kent wrote:
<snip> > >> I would also opine, that _not_ addressing other, identifiable and >> identified vulnerabilities, would be seen by the rest of the IETF and by the >> "users" of BGP (operators of the >>30k ASNs) as a massive #FAIL. > > Every WG operates based on inputs from its members, not on inputs from every > user of the Internet, every vendors, every network operator, etc. When a WG > reaches rough consensus that reflects the views of its members, the work > product is published to the IETF list as a whole, offering an opportunity for > broader comment. Even that does not ensure that every affected entity has > been consulted. yet, we persist ... My input is that the current work that does not address the real route leak threat, and it is therefore insufficient. Since you said that you want your work to reflect views that include mine, I'm just making my views clear... again. Also, I think it would behoove us to strive towards producing work that will be accepted by operators (as I think I see Brian saying). I think it's less about consulting everyone in the world and more about being realistic. For our work to be relevant, it has be operationally feasible... <snip> > >> That is, unless it is merely a matter of interpreting the words of the >> charter incorrectly, in which case, let's just get on with updating the >> threat model and finding solutions. > > The threat model was updated to reflect SIDR list comments on 2/3, 6 weeks > ago, and it garnered no responses. A new version was posted on 2/22, mostly > to replace cites of I-Ds with cites to RFCs. It also garnered no comments. Indeed, I'm printing it now... Eric _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
