note I do want to see rpki/sidr deployment move forward, but... On Tue, Nov 6, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Dan York <[email protected]> wrote: > > Here, in one easy-to-read article, is a great example of why we need RPKI > and/or other "secure routing" technologies that verify the origins of route > announcements: >
origin here doesn't seem to actually be bad. path here seems to be unchanged from a possible path. probably moratel shouldn't have tried to send all of their routes to the rest of the world? maybe the provider to moratel could have filter 'not moratel' routes? (or filtered any of their routes... just like they didn't for pktelecom in 07). > http://blog.cloudflare.com/why-google-went-offline-today-and-a-bit-about > > Note: SIDR got a nice callout in the commentary on Hacker News: > http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4747910 (the exact SIDR reference is > here: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4748108 ) yes, nice... sadly I'm not sure that sidr's work would have helped here (aside from the possible early deployment steps of 'make prefix-lists from rpki informed data from IRRs' ... of course, if you can't be bothered to make prefix-filters to day :( > -- > Dan York [email protected] > http://www.danyork.me/ skype:danyork > Phone: +1-802-735-1624 > Twitter - http://twitter.com/danyork > > > > > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr > _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
