On Nov 7, 2012, at 10:13 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > On Wed, Nov 7, 2012 at 9:11 AM, Dan York <[email protected]> wrote: >> Agreed, sadly... but the good news is that this whole thing did get more >> people thinking about the underlying router infrastructure. So if it gets >> some people to wake up and pay more attention, I think that's a good thing. > > yep.
Chris, Given that all the RPKI/BGPSEC machinery fully deployed would NOT have helped here, what is your key desire for this RPKI/SIDR/BGPSEC work? Is it simply for resource certification? What do you believe we should do about THIS problem? This is precisely why we wrote the "leak" draft (and the IRR draft) - work areas which are somehow out of scope of the _secure _inter-domain _routing WG. Heck, the Friday conflict with the GROW WG illustrates the disconnect here as well. And if at the end of the day the answer is that we need IRR-esque capabilities anyway, and if we'd did just that we could remove most of the threats in the routing system, then we sure appear to be doing a helluva lot of work here while totally ignoring these problems? -danny _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
