>> thank you. this makes a lot more sense than taking well-known >> exteme worst cases (since fixed) and using them to calculate a >> so called 'lower bound.' your document looks like responsible >> engineering and describes about the numbers we have been >> expecting and talking all along. thanks. > > Actually, Randy, engineering with the upper bound is pretty typical.
from your document "The calculations in this document, while just candidate representations of RPKI, project a very long lower-bound on the potential time needed for RP caches to gather all objects in the RPKI" > The counter tends to be viewed as quite amateurish. personally, i would be professionally embarrassed to have my name on such wild assed cabbage throwing as that document. > codifying a system's design after building an implementation, and then > retrofitting requirements to that design so that we can _then_ back > into a threat model that befits a system's capabilities is typically > frowned upon by engineers. let's be honest here. the threat model was done in the late '80s. the base of the design in the early '90s. we're just slogging through the saussage machine. randy _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
