Hi Sandy, As I said during the call for adoption, I think this is an important omission from RFC6487 and the document is well written.
Before sending my support to advance to the IESG, I wanted to ask the author if they have tested the effects of this change on existing RP tools. Do they really set the certificate as invalid? Roque On Jul 12, 2013, at 11:14 PM, "Murphy, Sandra" <[email protected]> wrote: > The chairs have queried the authors of draft-ietf-sidr-policy-qualifiers-00, > Policy Qualifiers in RPKI Certificates. The response was that the draft is > ready for wglc. > > There was general agreement on this draft during the adoption call, with one > request for additional security considerations being addressed in the new > version. The draft is short and straightforward and the wg has not seen fit > to comment further. > > Even so, it is unusual to publish a draft with so little comment during the > time it has been a wg draft. The chairs will be looking for a stronger than > usual response. Can't publish without reviews! > > This starts a 3 week wglc on draft draft-ietf-sidr-policy-qualifiers-00, > Policy Qualifiers in RPKI Certificates. Please do send comments to the list, > indicating that you do or do not believe that the draft is ready for > publication. > > The draft is available at > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-sidr-policy-qualifiers-00. > > --Sandy, speaking for the co-chairs > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
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