Chris: Yes, this is the correct process. You are welcome to discuss mechanism on the IDR list. Summarize the route leak context for people not reading both lists.
Sue -----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Christopher Morrow Sent: Friday, September 06, 2013 10:54 PM To: Stephen Kent Cc: [email protected] [email protected]; sidr Subject: Re: [GROW] [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-06.txt On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:38 PM, Stephen Kent <[email protected]> wrote: > Dave, > > Fair questions for a somewhat complex environment. > > SIDR develops security standards for inter-domain routing, working > within the context of BGP standards developed by IDR. > > GROW has more of an operations focus, and is intended to provide input > to IDR. > > So, your doc on route leaks, if approved in GROW, could inform IDR > about changes needed to BGP to counter this problem (which is not > contrary to current BGP semantics). In turn, IDR could elect to revise > BGP to address this problem, and then IDR could ask SIDR to develop > security mechanisms to enable ASes to enforce the revised BGP specs, > for example. this does sound like the agreed upon plan ... yes. _______________________________________________ GROW mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
