There's even a chair consensus statement on route leaks and forward plan: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg06014.html
--Sandy, speaking as wg co-chair ________________________________________ From: [email protected] [[email protected]] on behalf of Christopher Morrow [[email protected]] Sent: Friday, September 06, 2013 10:54 PM To: Stephen Kent Cc: [email protected] [email protected]; sidr Subject: Re: [sidr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-06.txt On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 4:38 PM, Stephen Kent <[email protected]> wrote: > Dave, > > Fair questions for a somewhat complex environment. > > SIDR develops security standards for inter-domain routing, working within > the context of > BGP standards developed by IDR. > > GROW has more of an operations focus, and is intended to provide input to > IDR. > > So, your doc on route leaks, if approved in GROW, could inform IDR about > changes > needed to BGP to counter this problem (which is not contrary to current BGP > semantics). In turn, IDR could elect to revise BGP to address this problem, > and > then IDR could ask SIDR to develop security mechanisms to enable ASes to > enforce the > revised BGP specs, for example. this does sound like the agreed upon plan ... yes. _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
