On Feb 8, 2014, at 5:21 AM, Randy Bush <[email protected]> wrote: > i think this is a worthwhile effort and this document is a good place to > start. >
+1 Some initial comments in-line. > -- > > presuming there is consensus to adopt, i have some some nits we can > discuss when it is a wg item. > > o i thought folk wanted a blank line between the URI(s) and the key > I am not sure that I care too much about this as long as it's well defined. But if the format is open to change, then I would feel more for a key=value style, or dare I say even json.. this is parsed by the machines after all. And using something like json makes it much more flexible regarding ordering of elements, or extending should that ever be necessary. > o last para of 2.2 says > > Where the TAL contains two or more rsync URIs, then the same > self-signed CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced > location. > > maybe should say what happens when one or more do not have the same > cert? does the whole TAL get ignored? I agree, but on top of that having multiple publication points by definition implies that there will be differences, albeit short lived. I would like to see wording along these lines. = TA MUST increment serial number whenever they re-issue the CA cert = TA SHOULD* publish the CA cert in all locations 'asap', within 1 hour? = TA SHOULD* remove the cert from unmaintained locations *: They may not be able to if this is hosted at a third party To handle all this more elegantly I think there should be a mechanism for TAs to publish replacement TALs. To add, or remove URIs, or even to do planned key rolls (for example: TA wants change HSM vendor). What if the TA could optionally publish one (1) signed object containing an updated TAL? And possibly some dates: do-not-use-this-before, and do-not-use-other-after? This would allow RPs to use existing TALs to discover updates and process automatically (it is signed by the key that I trust). It could stop re-trying retired URIs, and start using the new ones. And even planned key rolls could be as simple as this on this level (provided the TA re-issues and publishes all the products before the change date, under the new key and in its own repositories). > o same last para of 2.2 > > it is RECOMMENDED that the domain name parts of each of these > URIs resolve to distinct IP addresses that are used by a diverse > set of repository publication points, and these IP addresses be > included in distinct Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) > objects signed by different CAs. > > as this is ops guidance, and really the core of the proposed change, > perhaps the rationale for this should be given > > o 3.1 > > Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the URI(s) contained > in the TAL. > > you may want to give some guidance as to which one. pseudo-random? > first? think load balancing, proximity, ..., a la fns I like to see some guidance, but ultimately I think the RP should be allowed to choose a strategy. I would probably prefer to check all URIs regularly, and go with the certificate with the highest serial number (provided the key matches of course). Tim _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
