Hi, I took the text n draft-ietf-sidr-multiple-publication-points as it related to TAs and placed it into the RFC6490bis draft without change.
The syntax of the TAL is not something I care a lot about either - I suppose that one could get worried about rogue TA:s that try to place 1 million URIs into the TAL, and get into the whole JSON / plain ascii thing - I thought that the draft-ietf-sidr-multiple-publication-points document already had a certain level of WG buy-in behind it - I guess that was not a very good assumption on my part. I'll happily add what the WG wants here. The issue about multiple CA certs that are different was something the earlier draft was silent about. They simply said that they MUST be the same and left it at that. I'm not sure how critical an issue this is, and whet forms of additional mechanism are necessary to allow RPs to retrieve all the referenced CA certs and define an algorithm for them to follow to select the "best". My simplistic thinking about the original intent in draft-ietf-sidr-multiple-publication-points was that an RP would pick oine URI, and if that was unresponsive after some local threshold it wuould try another, and so on. The discussion so far has been based on an assumption that an RP would retrieve the CA cert from 2 or more URI's and then worry about the case where the URIs differ. I am not sure what to add here to the draft - the WG will need to provide further guidance on this. I worry about a proposal for RPs to check all URIs - it seems to me to be adding to the total load and I'm then not sure where the benefit of multiple URIs in TAs comes from in such a scenario. Finally, the issue obout URI diversity was again taken from teh original text and I had assumed that the WG had already considered this. regards, Geoff On 9 Feb 2014, at 12:14 am, Tim Bruijnzeels <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Feb 8, 2014, at 5:21 AM, Randy Bush <[email protected]> wrote: > >> i think this is a worthwhile effort and this document is a good place to >> start. >> > > +1 > > Some initial comments in-line. > >> -- >> >> presuming there is consensus to adopt, i have some some nits we can >> discuss when it is a wg item. >> >> o i thought folk wanted a blank line between the URI(s) and the key >> > > I am not sure that I care too much about this as long as it's well defined. > > But if the format is open to change, then I would feel more for a key=value > style, or dare I say even json.. this is parsed by the machines after all. > And using something like json makes it much more flexible regarding ordering > of elements, or extending should that ever be necessary. > >> o last para of 2.2 says >> >> Where the TAL contains two or more rsync URIs, then the same >> self-signed CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced >> location. >> >> maybe should say what happens when one or more do not have the same >> cert? does the whole TAL get ignored? > > I agree, but on top of that having multiple publication points by definition > implies that there will be differences, albeit short lived. > > I would like to see wording along these lines. > = TA MUST increment serial number whenever they re-issue the CA cert > = TA SHOULD* publish the CA cert in all locations 'asap', within 1 hour? > = TA SHOULD* remove the cert from unmaintained locations > *: They may not be able to if this is hosted at a third party > > To handle all this more elegantly I think there should be a mechanism for TAs > to publish replacement TALs. To add, or remove URIs, or even to do planned > key rolls (for example: TA wants change HSM vendor). What if the TA could > optionally publish one (1) signed object containing an updated TAL? And > possibly some dates: do-not-use-this-before, and do-not-use-other-after? > > This would allow RPs to use existing TALs to discover updates and process > automatically (it is signed by the key that I trust). It could stop re-trying > retired URIs, and start using the new ones. And even planned key rolls could > be as simple as this on this level (provided the TA re-issues and publishes > all the products before the change date, under the new key and in its own > repositories). > > >> o same last para of 2.2 >> >> it is RECOMMENDED that the domain name parts of each of these >> URIs resolve to distinct IP addresses that are used by a diverse >> set of repository publication points, and these IP addresses be >> included in distinct Route Origination Authorizations (ROAs) >> objects signed by different CAs. >> >> as this is ops guidance, and really the core of the proposed change, >> perhaps the rationale for this should be given >> >> o 3.1 >> >> Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the URI(s) contained >> in the TAL. >> >> you may want to give some guidance as to which one. pseudo-random? >> first? think load balancing, proximity, ..., a la fns > > I like to see some guidance, but ultimately I think the RP should be allowed > to choose a strategy. > > I would probably prefer to check all URIs regularly, and go with the > certificate with the highest serial number (provided the key matches of > course). > > > > Tim > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
