> i didn't update the tracker... (i hadn't ever in the past).
uh, that is between you and the datawhacker
> Did we circle down on an answer for the leak/persay language that
> everyone's happy with? If so I'd like to push out a pub request today.
as far as i am aware, there is no issue with leak language. we got past
folk looking up 'per se' in their dictionaries. the one open issue is
>>>>> 3.14 While the trust level of a route should be determined by the
>>>>> BGPsec protocol, local routing preference and policy MUST then
>>>>> be applied to best path and other routing decisions. Such
>>>>> mechanisms SHOULD conform with [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
>>>>> ...
>>>>> 3.17 If a BGPsec design makes use of a security infrastructure,
that
>>>>> infrastructure SHOULD enable each network operator to select
>>>>> the entities it will trust when authenticating data in the
>>>>> security infrastructure. See, for example,
>>>>> [I-D.ietf-sidr-ltamgmt].
>>>
>>> What about adding that "the connection to this security infrastructure
>>> MUST be through a secure channel"?
>
> it's done via rcynic and/or rpki-to-rtr, right? depending on where in
> the process you are... presuming the process looks like:
> publication-point - gatherer - cache - router
> (rcynic) (rcynic) (rpki-rtr)
apologies to roque. some external data were indeed what was meant (an
rpki-like thing is an example), and was inteneded by "security
infrastructure."
the authenticity of those data is an issue. we might say so in sec
cons.
and i am waiting for wglc to close so i can make the hack once.
randy
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