Hi Sandy, On 18/05/16 22:12, Sandra Murphy wrote: > comments inline. speaking as a regular ol’ wg member > > On May 18, 2016, at 12:20 PM, Brian Haberman > <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hiya Stephen, >> >> On 5/18/16 12:09 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>> >>> Hiya, >>> >>> On 18/05/16 17:06, Brian Haberman wrote: >>>> Hiya Stephen, >>>> >>>> On 5/18/16 11:51 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position >>>>> for draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: Discuss >>>>> >>>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and >>>>> reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. >>>>> (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Please refer to >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for >>>>> more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found >>>>> here: >>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> DISCUSS: >>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I'd like to check one thing - this may be needed for strict >>>>> compliance with RPKI thing but it seems kinda weird to also >>>>> impose that here, but anyway... >>>>> >>>>> Is 3.2 step 1 needed? That seems like useless complexity >>>>> here. If it is needed, how does the verifier check that it's >>>>> really a single-use? I don't see the point TBH. >>>>> >>>> >>>> This text was driven by the statement in RFC 6487 (Section 3) >>>> that says: >>>> >>>> The private key associated with an EE certificate is used to >>>> sign a single RPKI signed object, i.e., the EE certificate is >>>> used to validate only one object. >>>> >>>> Step 1 in 3.2 is there so that this approach follows the above >>>> directive on the use of the RPKI infrastructure/certificates. >>> >>> Well... sure. But what is the benefit here? IIRC that was >> >> I *think* the benefit is supposed to be compliance with the RPKI >> approach... >> >>> something related to making more fine-grained revocation possible >>> or something which doesn't seem that useful here since a verifier >>> will likely already have processed stuff already or am I mixed >>> up? >> >> I don't think you are mixed up, but I will let others in SIDR chime >> in… > > There was at one point in the history of resource certificates the > idea that EE certs could be used multiple times. (EE certs even had > their own manifests!) > > The signed object definition encapsulated the EE cert used to verify > the signature. That revocation of the signed object could be > accomplished by revoking the EE cert. Which meant that the EE cert > should be used just to sign that one object, as Stephen says. > (otherwise chaos ensues) > > As the only defined use of EE certs at the time of the publication of > 6487 was the use to verify signed objects, the text about EE certs > was reduced to just that necessary to support the single-use. > > This is different. The validity of the rpsl object is not tied to > the validity of the EE cert. The comments from the wg were that this > draft should talk about the syntax of the new attribute, not the > authorization/semantics. So revocation of the EE cert in this case > would/might not have the effect of revoking the rpsl object. I > personally don’t think it likely that it ever will, but that’s IMHO > only. > > So it is a moot question as to whether the single-use is a part of > “the RPKI approach” for this rpsl-sig use.
But that means that there is no reason to include the requirement here then or am I missing something? Deleting that "step" in the signing process would seem like a good idea so. (Assuming that current implementers, if any, are fine with that.) > >> >>> >>> If there's no benefit, it seems like that adds a bunch of CA code >>> just for fun (or "compliance" maybe;-) > > curious: how would this single-use requirement add anything to the CA > code? If the requirement is in 6487, the CA code would already have > the checks. I ask only because I might be missing something. What I was trying to say was that requiring signers of this to include all the CA code is the problem/oddity, esp if there's no real benefit. So the single-use thing doesn't add to the CA code, it adds a need for the CA code in the wrong place. And I guess if the spec says "once only" then I can well imagine some poor verifier implementer keeping some kind of cache and checking it'd not seen a signature before or something like that. And that'd also be kinda pointless code too I think. >> >> I could very easily see dropping step 1 from 3.2 and simply >> augmenting the intro sentence with something about certs/keys >> generated per 3487. > > I think you mean 6487? > > You have already suggested removing the SIA requirement from 6487 for > the EE certs rpsl-sig uses, so these EE certs are already a different > sort of EE cert. Other special requirements as necessary. Great - so no need to do the single-use thing here then? But I may not be grokking all the consequences of the above so please do correct me if I'm wrong. Cheers, S. > > —Sandy, speaking as a regular ol’ wg member > >
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