One further point... Dropping step 1 in section 3.2 is one part of this change. I think that the fourth bullet in section 5 can be dropped as well. Thoughts?
Regards, Brian On 5/19/16 8:11 AM, Brian Haberman wrote: > Hiya Stephen, > > On 5/18/16 5:23 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> >> Hi Sandy, >> >> On 18/05/16 22:12, Sandra Murphy wrote: >>> comments inline. speaking as a regular ol’ wg member >>> >>> On May 18, 2016, at 12:20 PM, Brian Haberman >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Hiya Stephen, >>>> >>>> On 5/18/16 12:09 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hiya, >>>>> >>>>> On 18/05/16 17:06, Brian Haberman wrote: >>>>>> Hiya Stephen, >>>>>> >>>>>> On 5/18/16 11:51 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >>>>>>> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position >>>>>>> for draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig-11: Discuss >>>>>>> >>>>>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and >>>>>>> reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. >>>>>>> (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Please refer to >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for >>>>>>> more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found >>>>>>> here: >>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpsl-sig/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> DISCUSS: >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> I'd like to check one thing - this may be needed for strict >>>>>>> compliance with RPKI thing but it seems kinda weird to also >>>>>>> impose that here, but anyway... >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is 3.2 step 1 needed? That seems like useless complexity >>>>>>> here. If it is needed, how does the verifier check that it's >>>>>>> really a single-use? I don't see the point TBH. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> This text was driven by the statement in RFC 6487 (Section 3) >>>>>> that says: >>>>>> >>>>>> The private key associated with an EE certificate is used to >>>>>> sign a single RPKI signed object, i.e., the EE certificate is >>>>>> used to validate only one object. >>>>>> >>>>>> Step 1 in 3.2 is there so that this approach follows the above >>>>>> directive on the use of the RPKI infrastructure/certificates. >>>>> >>>>> Well... sure. But what is the benefit here? IIRC that was >>>> >>>> I *think* the benefit is supposed to be compliance with the RPKI >>>> approach... >>>> >>>>> something related to making more fine-grained revocation possible >>>>> or something which doesn't seem that useful here since a verifier >>>>> will likely already have processed stuff already or am I mixed >>>>> up? >>>> >>>> I don't think you are mixed up, but I will let others in SIDR chime >>>> in… >>> >>> There was at one point in the history of resource certificates the >>> idea that EE certs could be used multiple times. (EE certs even had >>> their own manifests!) >>> >>> The signed object definition encapsulated the EE cert used to verify >>> the signature. That revocation of the signed object could be >>> accomplished by revoking the EE cert. Which meant that the EE cert >>> should be used just to sign that one object, as Stephen says. >>> (otherwise chaos ensues) >>> >>> As the only defined use of EE certs at the time of the publication of >>> 6487 was the use to verify signed objects, the text about EE certs >>> was reduced to just that necessary to support the single-use. >>> >>> This is different. The validity of the rpsl object is not tied to >>> the validity of the EE cert. The comments from the wg were that this >>> draft should talk about the syntax of the new attribute, not the >>> authorization/semantics. So revocation of the EE cert in this case >>> would/might not have the effect of revoking the rpsl object. I >>> personally don’t think it likely that it ever will, but that’s IMHO >>> only. >>> >>> So it is a moot question as to whether the single-use is a part of >>> “the RPKI approach” for this rpsl-sig use. >> >> But that means that there is no reason to include the requirement >> here then or am I missing something? Deleting that "step" in the >> signing process would seem like a good idea so. (Assuming that >> current implementers, if any, are fine with that.) > > As one implementer, I have no problem dropping this step. There is > nothing in my RPSL code that enforces this (it is a function of the RPKI > EE cert usage). > >> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> If there's no benefit, it seems like that adds a bunch of CA code >>>>> just for fun (or "compliance" maybe;-) >>> >>> curious: how would this single-use requirement add anything to the CA >>> code? If the requirement is in 6487, the CA code would already have >>> the checks. I ask only because I might be missing something. >> >> What I was trying to say was that requiring signers of this to >> include all the CA code is the problem/oddity, esp if there's no >> real benefit. >> >> So the single-use thing doesn't add to the CA code, it adds a >> need for the CA code in the wrong place. >> >> And I guess if the spec says "once only" then I can well imagine >> some poor verifier implementer keeping some kind of cache and >> checking it'd not seen a signature before or something like that. >> And that'd also be kinda pointless code too I think. > > I certainly don't do any type of checking at the verification step. > > Regards, > Brian >
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