Does this apply to the Certificate Policy OID too? If memory is correct, the current CP has a normative pinter to RFC 3779.
Russ On Jul 19, 2016, at 7:18 AM, Rob Austein <[email protected]> wrote: > Reminding the WG of an old issue I raised years ago for validation > reconsidered which, as far as I know, has not yet been addressed. > > If we change the validation algorithm, we really should also change > the object identifiers used in the X.509v3 extensions used to convey > the resources. > > The reason for this is simple: the RFC 3779 validation algorithm has > shipped, long since. My implementation has been part of OpenSSL for > the last decade, and while it's not enabled by default on all > platforms, it is on some, and is available as a configuration option > on others. It is far too late to change this, that ship has sailed. > > So if we're talking about changing the validation algorithm now, we > need to label the algorithm we're using, so that validation code knows > which algorithm it's supposed to follow. Otherwise, we'll get > different validation results at different sites depending on which > algorithm they're using this week, different routing decisions as a > consequence, dogs and cats living together, mass hysteria. > > The solution to this is simple: change the extension OIDs. X.509's > "critical extension" mechanism will take care of the rest. > > This will require some kind of phase-in/phase-out process during which > the new OIDs appear and the old OIDs vanish, and will require RP code > to implement the new OIDs, but these are trivial issues given that the > RP behavior has to change in any case, that being the point of the > entire validation reconsidered exercise. > > Yes, this will be a bit painful, but I view it as in essence exposing > a problem that already exists, rather than sweeping it under the rug. > > Sorry for reminding the WG of this yet again at what some may consider > a late date, but I have raised this issue before, I just haven't > (re)raised it in the last few months. > > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
