On Nov 30, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Randy Bush <[email protected]> wrote:
> section 4.5 of 4593 is relevant, or all of sec 4
Thanks, used in the text below.
> i am kinda sad that 7132 is not too good on this
I looked there first but it's a *path* security threat model so can't really be
blamed for not covering this.
Candidate new security section below. I'd appreciate an ack from Alvaro that
this addresses his concern before I publish.
--John
6. Security Considerations
Security considerations such as those described in [RFC4272] continue
to apply. Since this document introduces an extended community that
will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis in
Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant. These issues
are neither new, nor unique to the origin validation extended
community.
The security considerations provided in [RFC6811] apply equally to
this application of origin validation. In addition, this document
describes a scheme where router A outsources validation to some
router B. If this scheme is used, the participating routers should
have the appropriate trust relationship -- B should trust A either
because they are under the same administrative control or for some
other reason (for example, consider
[I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]). The security properties of
the propagation path between the two routers should also be
considered. See [RFC7454] Section 5.1 for advice regarding
protection of the propagation path.
(all the refs above are in the "informative" section)
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